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Beyond Zero-Sum 
Environmentalism
by Shalanda Baker, Robin Kundis 
Craig, John Dernbach, Keith Hirokawa, 
Sarah Krakoff, Jessica Owley, Melissa 
Powers, Shannon Roesler, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom, J .B . Ruhl, Jim Salzman, 
Inara Scott, and David Takacs
Summary
Environmental law and environmental protection are 
often portrayed as requiring trade offs: “jobs versus 
environment,” “markets versus regulation,” “enforce-
ment versus incentives .” In the summer of 2016, mem-
bers of the Environmental Law Collaborative gathered 
to consider how environmentalism and environmen-
tal regulation can advance beyond this framing to 
include new constituents and offer new pathways to 
tackle the many significant challenges ahead . Months 
later, the initial activities of the Trump Administra-
tion highlighted the use of zero-sum rhetoric, with the 
appointment of government officials and the issuance 
of executive orders that indeed seem to view environ-
mental issues as in a zero-sum relationship with jobs 
or economic progress . In the essays below, the authors 
explore the meaning and the role of zero-sum environ-
mentalism as a first step in moving beyond it .
I. What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Zero-Sum Environmentalism
This section was authored by Jessica Owley, Professor, SUNY 
Buffalo Law School.
In the summer of 2016, a small but hardy group of law pro-
fessors gathered to discuss the concept of zero-sum envi-
ronmentalism . We had set for our agenda to get “beyond” 
zero-sum environmentalism . The suggestion was that there 
is a dominant approach to environmental law issues that 
frames them as zero-sum and that this framing can be 
damaging to environmental progress . What we grappled 
with, though, is whether environmental problems really are 
(at least at times) zero-sum . Is the description of an envi-
ronmental issue as zero-sum ever accurate? Are laws treat-
ing issues as zero-sum when they should not be doing so? 
Or maybe ignoring a zero-sum framework that is at play?
Perhaps there are no zero-sum dynamics in the real 
world and instead “zero-sum” is just the language we 
(or some of us) use to describe environmental trade offs . 
Zero-sum as used in the context of environmental policy 
implies stark winners and losers . If the environment wins, 
the economy must lose . To protect the owls, we destroy 
the lives of the loggers . To prevent global climate change, 
Americans must completely change life as they know it . 
Indeed, the concept, if not language, of zero-sum appears 
particularly prevalent in the new Donald Trump Adminis-
tration, where actions in favor of environmental protection 
are couched as actions against the economy .
Our discussions revealed (unsurprisingly) that we all 
came to this question with different examples, assump-
Authors’ Note: The authors collectively engaged in this work as part 
of the Environmental Law Collaborative (ELC). This project would 
not have been possible without generous support from the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and the Baldy Center for Law 
and Social Policy at the University at Buffalo. The Collaborative was 
also enriched by Holly Doremus and Stephen Miller who, while they 
were unable to join in writing essays, both attended and contributed 
to the discussion. ELC thanks ELI for its continual support of our 
efforts. ELC’s first collection of essays appeared in the Environmental 
Law Reporter (ELR) four years ago. [See Michael Burger et al ., 
Rethinking Sustainability to Meet the Climate Change Challenge, 
43 ELR 10342 (Apr . 2013)] . The group expanded these essays into 
a book-length project. [Rethinking Sustainability to Meet 
the Climate Change Challenge (Jessica Owley & Keith 
Hirokawa eds . 2015)] . The second collection of essays appeared in 
ELR in 2015. [Sarah Adams-Schoen et al ., A Response to the IPCC 
Fifth Assessment, 45 ELR 10027 (Jan . 2015)], with a following 
book [Contemporary Issues in Climate Change Law and 
Policy: Essays Inspired by the IPCC (Robin Kundis Craig & 
Stephen R . Miller eds ., 2016)].
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tions, and solutions . Some people rejected the idea that 
zero-sum problems ever actually exist, and suggested that 
reliance on the framework and use of the term can be dam-
aging to environmental governance—not just because it is 
an overly constrained view of how trade offs actually work, 
but also because the language of zero-sum necessarily cre-
ates a combative stance that can impede collaboration and 
creative thinking . Others suggested that for some environ-
mental concerns, the zero-sum framework was underused . 
That is, we might reach better results if we confront the 
actual trade offs . What work does it do to label environ-
mental problems as a zero-sum game? In this case, climate 
change and biodiversity protection serve as key examples . 
Maybe we do need to emphasize that you cannot have your 
cake and eat it too . Building that hospital will indeed lead 
to the extinction of a species . Putting the conundrum in 
stark terms might help highlight the need for embracing 
the principle of in dubio pro natura1 (when in doubt act in 
favor of nature) .
Most of us agreed, however, that when we see the zero-
sum rhetoric or when we use it ourselves, we are not really 
talking the language of economists .2 We are taking their 
term and simplifying it (taking a complex topic from 
another discipline and simplifying it for our use is some-
thing we legal academics are good at) .3 But more than that, 
1 . Josefina Russo & Ricardo Russo, In Dubio Pro Natura: Un Principio de 
Precaución y Prevención a Favor de los Recursos Naturales, 5 Tierra Tropical 
1659 (2009) .
2 . See, e.g., Avinash K . Dixit & and Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy: 
Fourth International Student Edition 225 (2015) (describing basic 
principles of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games in economics) .
3 . Or perhaps not that good at . See, e.g., Richard A . Posner, Legal Scholarship 
Today, 115 Harv . L . Rev . 1314, 1326 (2002) (“Remarkable, too, is the 
insouciance with which they discuss concepts from other fields, such as 
political science, with nary a reference to the scholarly literature in those 
fields .”) . See also Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 
we realized that we are not the ones using this term . In 
fact, it is not heavily used in the legal academy . It is used in 
the media, though, and by politicians .
Figure 1, above, (created by Google’s Ngram function) 
shows an increased use of the phrase “zero-sum” in books 
first appearing around 1940 and increasingly used since 
then, with a tapering off beginning in 2000 . However, 
overall, there is not a high frequency of use of the phrase . 
And “zero-sum environmentalism” did not appear often 
enough to be plotted with Google’s Ngram function .4
Following this train of thought, maybe the mission of 
going beyond zero-sum environmentalism is to reject the 
use of the term—to emphasize that it is not really occur-
ring . Or maybe it is to show the strength of the attitude of 
zero-sum . If we think that a zero-sum approach is flawed 
as overly simplistic, then highlighting where actors/policy-
makers are treating complex environmental problems as 
zero-sum issues can reveal flaws in policymaking . Daylight-
ing the zero-sum framework can expose overly simplified 
approaches to environmental protection efforts, allowing 
one to target those arenas as needing richer analyses .
Once I began looking for it, I saw zero-sum issues 
throughout my work . For example, I have often complained 
about the nature of property law arrangements (specifically 
conservation easements) to break instead of bend .5 That is, 
Yale J .L . & Human . 79, 79-80 (1992) (suggesting that often legal academics 
incorporate other disciplines in a “sub-standard” or “superficial” way) .
4 . See Google Books, Ngram Viewer, https://books .google .com/ngrams 
(last visited Mar . 3, 2017) . What would be more interesting is to chart this 
phrase in speeches, academic publications, and news articles, but Google has 
yet to make such an Ngram (at least not one that is publicly available), and 
searching through such piles of documents is beyond the task of this essay .
5 . See, e.g., Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change 
Crossroads, 74 Law & Contemp . Probs . 199 (2011); Jessica Owley, Property 
Constructs and Nature’s Challenge to Perpetuity, in Environmental Law and 
Contrasting Ideas of Nature: A Constructivist Approach 64 (Keith 
Hirokawa ed . 2014) .
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Figure 1: Ngram of “Zero-Sum”
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when something starts to go wrong, making it challenging 
or impossible to comply with a conservation easement, the 
legal solution from a property law standpoint is to termi-
nate the agreement instead of amending it . Thus, either we 
have the conservation easement in place or we do not .
You can think about this as arising in other disputes 
over property as well . Despite the tales of King Solomon,6 
property law does not actually split the baby or often 
divide up property . Instead, it is commonly an all-or-noth-
ing approach where one person is declared a winner and 
another the loser . Someone gets mom’s house; we do not 
really draw a line down the middle and force the squab-
bling sisters to share it (although I think there are probably 
multiple movies with that story line  .  .  . if not, I call dibs) .
Suggesting that the all-or-nothing approach does not 
need to be the solution for conservation lands, Nancy 
McLaughlin has successfully argued (and convinced many 
conservationists and courts) that we should go beyond 
property law and import charitable trust principles into 
conservation easement law to enable changes to conserva-
tion easements that are more likely to foster greater land 
protection .7 Even judges are willing to deviate from the 
zero-sum approach, as we see with Judge Kevin McCarthy 
in the famous dispute over Barry Bonds’ 73rd home-run 
baseball, who decided to split the value of the ball rather 
than award it to one of the parties claiming to have caught 
it8—as would have been the more traditional property law 
approach .9 As these examples show, deviations from the 
zero-sum approach may be increasing in acceptance even 
in the strict context of property law .
Maybe the problem is not that we need to rethink and 
find alternatives to the zero-sum approach, but indeed to 
realize that we never should have framed the problems as 
zero-sum in the first place . Perhaps labeling things like 
land conservation as a zero-sum game was reductive from 
the start (problems are decidedly more complicated than 
Solomon’s baby-splitting approach suggests) . In land con-
servation, for example, we do not simply decide that land is 
to be set aside for pure conservation in a reserve-like setting 
or to be actively exploited to generate wealth . Instead, the 
potential arrangements and uses of the land are numerous . 
Indeed, we can often both protect environmental features 
and promote economic returns for the landowners .
Zero-sum analyses in the economic sense are usually 
modeled as a two-player game .10 Our land conservation 
example, however, shows us that it is too simplistic to 
look at environmental problems that way . It is not simply 
“Environment” as player one and “People” as player two . 
A myriad of players and arrangements can be benefited 
6 . 1 Kings 30 .
7 . See Nancy A . McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and 
Beyond, 34 Ecology L .Q . 673 (2007) . See also Kolb v . City of Storm 
Lake, 736 N .W .2d 546 (Iowa 2007) (applying the cy pres doctrine to a 
conservation easement) .
8 . Popov v . Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal . Sup . Ct . 2002) .
9 . See, e.g., Zachary D . Kuperman, Cutting the Baby in Half: An Economic 
Critique of Indivisible Resource Partition, 77 Brook . L . Rev . 263 (2011) .
10 . See Dixit & Skeath, supra note 2, at 225 .
and harmed by choices in land conservation arrangements . 
Other environmental issues are no less complicated .
The label of “zero-sum” should probably be setting off 
alarm bells for us . Indeed, we might want to keep close tabs 
for use of the phrase in environmental contexts . Each time 
we see policymakers using the terms, it should be a signal 
to us . Tracking “zero-sum environmentalism” might help 
highlight a flaw in the system . Whether we reject the fram-
ing or embrace it, we all agree that deeper investigation 
into how policymakers and academics approach environ-
mental concerns can improve outcomes .
II. Seeing Past the Zero-Sum Game in 
Environmental Policy—Harder Than  
It Looks
This section was authored by J.B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen 
Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Program on Law and 
Innovation, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and 
Land Use Program, Vanderbilt University.
In Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny, Robert Wright 
offers a sweeping view of human evolution that culmi-
nates in his argument that modern society has become so 
complex and interconnected that there are no true “zero-
sum” games to be played between people or institutions .11 
Economists and game theorists use the zero-sum game 
concept to describe a situation in which each participant’s 
gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or 
gains) of the utility of the other participant(s) . A zero-sum 
game is not necessarily a bad situation—in fact, it is what 
economists argue markets and trading should produce . 
The reason is that if the situation is nonzero-sum, then, by 
definition, one participant can gain by more than another 
loses, or even both can gain . That is why sellers sell prod-
ucts and consumers buy them! The market depends on 
traders to identify nonzero-sum situations and trade away 
until they reach zero-sum, which is what economists refer 
to as Pareto optimality .
Being in a zero-sum game can be a sticky situation, how-
ever, if there is some reason why redistribution of the pie is 
necessary . If it were just up to the participants in a zero-sum 
game, and assuming they are what economists describe as 
“rational economic actors,” they would not agree to redis-
tribute the pie unless someone (irrationally) volunteers to 
be made worse off to make someone else better off . But it is 
not always up to just the participants . Sometimes govern-
ment, in pursuit of a desired social policy, intervenes to 
force a “trade” that at least some of the participants would 
not voluntarily (rationally) make .
If Wright’s thesis is right, however, government ought to 
be able to intervene on behalf of social policy without con-
cern about unsettling participants in zero-sum situations, 
because most social contexts really operate as nonzero-sum 
11 . Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (Reprint ed . 
2001) .
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value gallons of water for their ecological effect, and other 
interests value them for other reasons . Counting gallons 
of water does not get at what groups in the system really 
value, but it is the easiest metric to count . In a market trad-
ing context, so long as each trader knows the value it places 
on the water, trades will occur until zero-sum equilibrium 
is met . But in a regulatory context, government is act-
ing as the “market,” assigning the values, and forcing the 
“trades .” The various interests thus are more likely to con-
test the government’s assigned values than they would were 
the reallocation taking place in the market through volun-
tary trades . The result is that gallons of water becomes the 
default metric, which makes it difficult for the farmers to 
see anything but a one-for-one reallocation from them to 
the other interests—a zero-sum game .
Another obscuring factor is the multi-scalar nature 
of SESs . The appeal to nonzero-sumness often involves 
looking at the macro-scale dynamics and evaluating sys-
temwide impacts of a change in allocation of resources, 
such as through cost-benefit analysis, to demonstrate 
net gain in social welfare . But many actors in the SES 
understandably focus on scales most relevant to their well-
being, which often are micro-scale in scope . It is at these 
micro scales that the reallocation begins to look more like 
zero-sum, as with the farmers in the water reallocation 
scenario . In short, proving that the macro scale operates 
in nonzero-sum dynamics does not mean there are no 
dynamics at smaller scales that come much closer to zero-
sum . Expecting the “losers” in those small-scale contexts 
to think big-picture is a big ask, particularly when it takes 
teams of ecologists and economists to describe the macro-
scale SES dynamics .
There is also the temporal transition dimension to con-
sider . When game theorists study zero-sum game trading 
behavior, the trades are usually immediate between the 
traders . In the real world—particularly the world of envi-
ronmental policy—the trades tend to stretch out over time . 
Climate change presents this problem in spades, where 
most of the “losers” bearing the cost of regulation are in 
the present and most of the “winners” benefitting from the 
regulation are in the future . The “green jobs” argument for 
shifting to renewable energy also has this dimension, as 
the “war on coal” rhetoric frames the dynamic as one com-
munity losing jobs in the present to make jobs for others 
in the future . Even the water reallocation scenario presents 
this problem, however, as the rehabilitation of the aquatic 
resources and the wonderful benefits that will flow from it 
could take decades to materialize to the point of sending 
benefits back to the farmers—by which time the farmers 
that gave up the water and bore that cost may no longer be 
on the scene .
Both the multi-scalar and temporal transition prob-
lems are exacerbated by the distribution of costs and ben-
efits leading to what is often an imbalance in magnitude 
between the costs borne and the benefits received by the 
“losers .” Even if the farmers in the water allocation scenario 
grow to accept that the nonzero-sumness operates at the 
dynamics . Indeed, this is an expressed or implied premise 
of much of environmental policy, the idea being that net 
social welfare is increased—the pie only gets bigger—as we 
protect the environment to protect ourselves . Many envi-
ronmental protection advocates eschew talking about pol-
icy in these crass economic terms, preferring to emphasize 
the intrinsic value of nature, social justice, and other non-
market justifications for making people change behavior to 
improve environmental conditions . But the bottom line is 
that much of environmental policy rests on the promise of 
improving the greater good by leveraging the ubiquitous 
presence of nonzero-sumness .
Take water allocation as an example . If environmen-
tal policy moves in the direction of conserving aquatic 
resources, government might intervene to force farmers 
using water from a river to reduce diversions and let more 
water go downstream to, say, an estuary . The key here is 
that the government does not pay fair market value for the 
water—the reduced diversion is required by regulation, 
such as under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) . On the 
surface, this looks like a zero-sum game—every additional 
gallon going downstream is one less gallon for the farmers, 
and they are not compensated for their loss . But wait! The 
increase in water into the estuary improves conditions for 
a fishery; the fishing and tourism industries thrive; more 
people can buy the farmers’ crops; the farmers can buy less 
expensive fish; and so on . Everything is interconnected, so 
nothing is a zero-sum game .
Try telling that to the farmers . The problem with 
Wright’s thesis, and with using it to justify environmental 
policy, is that it turns back on itself . There is no question 
that social-ecological systems (SESs) are highly com-
plex and interconnected, making true zero-sum games 
hard to find . But the sheer complexity of massive SESs is 
what also makes it excruciatingly difficult to connect all 
the dots of the nonzero-sum game within the SES . At a 
macro scale, nonzero-sum rules; at the micro scale of the 
farmer seeing more water go by the farm in the river, it 
looks like zero-sum .
One of the major obstacles environmental policy has had 
in gaining broader and lasting legitimacy is the difficulty of 
convincing participants who believe they are in zero-sum 
games and being unfairly treated by environmental regula-
tion that they are in fact in nonzero-sum games, and are 
going to be fine . Appeals to the intrinsic value of nature do 
not get very far with most people who feel rammed into 
such “loser” situations . Indeed, the perception that one or 
one’s community is stuck in an “I/we lose, they win” zero-
sum situation can be so strong that social psychologists 
refer to it as the zero-sum mentality . And there are many 
factors at play making it difficult for those “afflicted” with 
this condition to see past the perceived zero-sum game to 
find the win-win zen of nonzero-sumness .
First, there is the problem of mixed metrics that the par-
ticipants in the situation are using to assess their positions . 
For example, in the water allocation scenario, the farmers 
value gallons of water for crops, the environmental interests 
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government intervention and help all participants com-
municate more openly about perceived zero-sum problems 
and their solutions .
III. Strategies for Zero-Sum Challenges
This section was authored by Jim Salzman, UCSB Bren 
School and UCLA Law School.
Politicians love to talk about the glossy world of “Win-
Win Scenarios .” Battling climate change will also grow 
the renewables sector and create thousands of green jobs . 
Catch-shares programs will increase the fishing commu-
nity’s incomes and conserve fisheries . Energy conserva-
tion saves fuel bills and drives efficiency improvements . 
Famed Harvard Business School professor, Michael Por-
ter, has even hypothesized that countries with stricter 
environmental regulations are more competitive in the 
global marketplace .12
To be sure, there are plenty of examples of win-win sce-
narios in the environmental field, but it is wishful think-
ing to assume that many, much less most, environmental 
conflicts can be solved with all parties better off . It is often 
the case that one or more parties feel trapped in a zero-sum 
game . Farmers in the Klamath Valley see their irrigation 
water allocation reduced because the endangered salmon 
need more . Fish win . Farmers lose . In the Pacific North-
west’s spotted owl saga of the 1990s, logging companies 
lost access to old growth redwood stands that were deemed 
to be critical habitat for the endangered owl . Owls win . 
Loggers lose . One could easily provide similar examples in 
the pollution context .
Most environmental policies have winners and losers . 
One might argue that these policies benefit society overall, 
but it sure does not feel like a benefit to the local resource-
dependent communities . These are decisions with diffuse 
winners and locally concentrated losers . To them, they are 
trapped in a zero-sum conflict where they need to stand 
their ground against opposing interests who would have 
them reduce their emissions, water usage, or timber har-
vest . “Either I win and continue the status quo, or they win 
and I have to pay, or perhaps even go out of business .”
Given the ubiquity of such zero-sum framing, it should 
not be surprising that environmental law has developed a 
range of strategies to address them . They fall under three 
basic categories: There Should Be Losers, Grow the Pie, or 
Regulatory Flexibility .
•	 The first category, There Should Be Losers, recog-
nizes the zero-sum game for what it is and lets the 
consequences flow . Put another way, there are some 
activities or actors that should lose out . This is a nor-
mative position, of course, that favors certain results 
over others . Companies that discharge dangerous 
toxics into a local stream should be forced to stop, 
12 . Michael Porter & Claus van der Linde, Towards a New Conception of the 
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J . Econ . Persp . 117 (1995) .
macro-scale, plays out over time, and produces net aggre-
gate social benefit, their particular cost-benefit ledger looks 
like a bad deal . They bear most of the cost of the water real-
location, but share in the benefits with the rest of the SES 
community in a diffuse distribution . This problem plagues 
the ESA, where protection of species often affects specific 
communities while the claimed benefits of biodiversity are 
far more diffusely enjoyed .
Even getting a handle on these problems does not neces-
sarily avoid the problem of imprecise valuation . The claim 
that the water reallocation is a nonzero-sum dynamic can 
be argued coherently as an ecological, economic, and soci-
ological proposition, but proving it in dollars and cents is a 
far different matter . In short, we do not have the methods 
to do it reliably . Biodiversity is great, but how much is it 
worth? This problem has stymied the integration of eco-
system services concepts into policy decisionmaking—we 
know that ecosystems provide valuable nonmarket services 
such as water filtration by riparian habitat, but putting a 
value on them is quite difficult, particularly at the small 
scales where one group perceives a zero-sum dynamic with 
them as the “losers .”
Lastly, the polarizing effect of government intervention 
often complicates environmental policy by immediately 
and tangibly dividing groups into us-versus-them camps . 
One can easily imagine the water reallocation scenario as 
the result of federal regulation supported by national envi-
ronmental nongovernmental organizations and opposed 
by a local farming community and its local government . 
As the interests square off, all the factors discussed above 
get in the way of the appeal to nonzero-sumness: instead 
it’s crop values versus estuary values, national versus local, 
long time frames, farmers’ loss of water creating diffuse 
benefits, no reliable dollar signs on the benefit side, and all 
being crammed down on the farmers by federal regulation 
with no compensation . One must be rather insensitive to 
expect the farmers not to suffer from zero-sum mentality 
in that story line .
Environmental policy needs to take the zero-sum 
mentality seriously . Pitching environmental regulation as 
nonzero-sum while not considering pockets of small-scale 
dynamics that look much more like zero-sum has led over 
and over to conflict, litigation, and bruised relationships . 
Ignoring the problem by refusing to speak of zero and 
nonzero also does not help . This is why work on collab-
orative adaptive management, quantification of ecosystem 
services, resilience, and other ingredients of adaptive gov-
ernance is essential to pursue and sustain .
Adaptive governance must seek to identify pockets of 
perceived zero-sum games within the larger SES manage-
ment context, and work with the “losers” to achieve a bet-
ter framing of the dynamics and explore policy options to 
counter the zero-sum mentality . Adaptive governance can-
not change the physical and social realities of SESs—they 
have many metrics, are multi-scalar, evolve over time, are 
uneven in distribution, and are difficult to quantify—but 
adaptive governance can change the polarizing effect of 
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even if it does hurt their bottom line . In the zero-
sum conflict of continuing polluting versus safe 
waters, safe waters should win . This may seem a sat-
isfying strategy, but keep in mind that the measure 
of “unacceptable” behaviors varies according to the 
observer . Conservation interests may well view over-
grazing on public lands as a travesty that has gone on 
for far too long . Ranching interests take the oppo-
site view . Which will win out in a zero-sum conflict 
of grazing versus range conservation? That depends 
on which administration is running the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) . A strategy that assumes 
the losers in zero-sum conflicts deserve to lose looks 
great if your team is in power . It can seem punitive or 
worse if you are on the losing side . No wonder, then, 
that this strategy leads to protracted litigation, over-
blown rhetoric, and, in the extreme, armed standoffs 
such as the one that occurred at the Malheur Wild-
life Refuge .
•	 A second category seeks to Grow the Pie . What 
looks like a zero-sum game with only eight slices of 
pie to go around, morphs into a win-win scenario if 
suddenly the pie is enlarged with four more pieces 
to go around because the government pays off the 
losers . We generally see this approach where the 
potentially losing party is politically powerful . As 
J .B . Ruhl has documented, agricultural interests are 
more often paid to protect the environment than 
required to do so . Some fisheries facing restrictions 
have benefited from vessel buyback programs . The 
farmers and fishers may be losing, in the sense their 
actions are restricted, but at least they are being paid 
for the sacrifice . Similarly, the 1990 Clean Air Act 
(CAA)13 Amendments explicitly sought to compen-
sate coal mining communities for the expected losses 
in jobs digging high-sulfur Appalachian coal . Grow-
ing the pie can be a popular strategy for the parties 
involved, but not so attractive to taxpayers and those 
concerned over budget deficits . If regulation proves 
politically infeasible, however, then growing the pie 
may be palatable . Even here, though, the parties may 
not all be happy . Penn Central was certainly not con-
tent to receive tradable development rights for Grand 
Central Station in place of its lost air rights, nor do 
some environmental groups approve of paying farm-
ers not to pollute .
•	 The third category presents the Regulatory Flex-
ibility of growing the pie . Here, the losers are paid 
off through regulatory paths rather than through 
dollars . This is evident in the Clean Water Act’s 
(CWA’s)14 §404 permit program for wetlands . On 
its face, the program seems to prohibit dredging 
and filling wetlands under a wide range of circum-
13 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q; ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .
14 . 3 U .S .C . §§1251-1387; ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607 .
stances . In practice, wetlands mitigation bank-
ing acts as a political steam valve, allowing much 
development to proceed by compensating with con-
structed wetlands somewhere else . We see a similar 
dynamic with habitat conservation plans . Develop-
ers who would have perceived the lack of a permit as 
a zero-sum dynamic—local economic growth versus 
a wetland or endangered fly—instead see, if not a 
win-win dynamic, at least a situation where the costs 
of doing business are acceptable and the project goes 
forward . Like growing the pie, regulatory steam 
valves tend to be put in place when the losers are 
politically powerful and regulating them runs either 
legal or political risks .
None of these strategies is necessarily better than the 
other . The relative merits of There Should Be Losers, Grow 
the Pie, and Regulatory Flexibility will vary depending 
on the politics of the actors, the nature of the harm, and 
the public funds available . The key point is that zero-sum 
games need to pay special attention to the losers, whether 
they warrant compensation and, if so, what type of benefit 
is most appropriate .
IV. Deep Equity, Zero-Sum 
Environmentalism, and a  
Sustainable Planet
This section was authored by David Takacs, Professor of Law, 
UC Hastings College of Law.
As humans appropriate ever more of the planet’s bounty, 
leaving less for nonhuman species and the ecosystems they 
inhabit, conflicts emerge over who or what gets which 
resources . Such skirmishes result in some of the unproduc-
tive zero-sum framings we too often see .
These zero-sum skirmishes extend to what are the 
appropriate frames through which to view the natural 
world, and thus how we set priorities to manage that world . 
Are ecosystems gardens to be cultivated and manipulated 
for human needs? Or are they wildernesses imbued with 
intrinsic value, whose species are valuable for their own 
sake, to be managed for continued ecological function and 
evolutionary potential?
In three of my research arenas, promoters of new 
conservation strategies split the difference, modulat-
ing between nature as sacred and nature as profane . In 
all cases, these three multifaceted approaches to solving 
problems serve as counter-narratives to win-lose, zero-
sum environmentalism .
Public funders and private investors are pouring bil-
lions of dollars into Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in the developing 
world . In REDD+, investors pay people to preserve car-
bon in trees, and then sell credits based on the stored 
carbon to those who wish to offset their own greenhouse 
gas emissions . In biodiversity offsetting, rapidly gaining 
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currency as a tool that (potentially) promotes prudent 
economic and ecological planning, developers degrade 
biodiversity in one place in exchange for paying to protect 
it elsewhere . And the South African government is man-
aging water as ecological infrastructure in its attempt to 
fulfill the constitutionally guaranteed right to safe, clean 
drinking water . Focusing on the 8% of the nation’s land 
that provides the source for 50% of its water, policymak-
ers plan simultaneously to create more and cleaner water, 
augment local ecosystem services, protect nonhuman 
species, and create jobs for poor people in rural areas . 
Each of these examples presents nonzero-sum solutions 
to environmental problems and broadens the way we 
frame the problems in the first place .
Zero-sum framings do not mesh with an ecologi-
cal worldview, which requires that we look at connec-
tions among multiple entities across time and space and 
reconsider the currencies by which “wins” and “losses” 
are tallied . In the three examples above, currencies 
(potentially) expand beyond immediate financial gain 
and loss to include local and global ecosystem services 
provided, greenhouse gases mitigated, aesthetic and bio-
philic benefits accrued, democratic decisionmaking par-
ticipation rights enjoyed, human rights of present and 
future generations guaranteed, jobs created, and econo-
mies grown . This gives us a more expansive view of who 
might “win” when we implement novel approaches to 
environmental problems .
Before we throw the zero-sum paradigm out with the 
bathwater, we must acknowledge that underlying some 
zero-sum framing is the practical and ethical principle 
that someone does have to pay to effect environmental 
solutions, and someone should have to pay . For all the 
multiple winners in multiple currencies, some people do 
lose . In REDD+ (as its promoters portray it), northern 
nations (through their citizens and businesses) pay, and 
poor people and the biodiversity that sustains them win . 
In biodiversity offsetting, the developer (and those ben-
efiting from new development) pay, and biodiversity (and 
people at the new offset site with new, enhanced eco-
systems) may win . And in South Africa, the rich, major 
water consumers pay through cross tariffs and taxes (and 
wealthy landowners’ property use may be restricted in 
various ways)—while poor people gain by acquiring sub-
sidized, clean water . In all three, those who prize diverse 
ecosystems, the biodiversity those systems harbor, and 
the ecosystem services they provide win . But even those 
who do not explicitly prize these ecological assets none-
theless benefit from enhanced environmental amenities, 
albeit in more diffuse ways, harder to quantify by tradi-
tional zero-sum means .
I am implying here that some entities—the polluters, 
those who consume more than their fair share—should 
lose, at least by paying for their consumption and pollu-
tion, and others should gain . In international environmen-
tal law, the ethical principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (CBDR) compels all nations to steward 
the global commons, but requires wealthier nations to 
make greater contributions . As an emerging principle 
of customary international law, legal obligations stem 
from pragmatic reality rooted in ethical obligation . Prag-
matically, only some nations have financial resources to 
mitigate environmental damage and help others adapt 
to environmental disruptions; ethically, those resources 
come from economies that developed without paying for 
environmentally destructive externalities . CBDR, applied 
to nations in the law, is also available as an ethical prin-
ciple that underlies the drive to have wealthy individuals 
transfer some of that wealth to clean up environmental 
messes we have created from our overconsumption and 
overproduction . So, in the examples here, the carbon 
polluter, the ecosystem degrader, and the water glutton 
should pay so that those who suffer from greenhouse gas 
pollution, from ecosystem degradation, and from lack of 
clean water may benefit .
By taking a more multidimensional approach to envi-
ronmental problem solving—by naming multiple winners 
and fewer losers, by highlighting ecological connections, 
and by trading in different currencies—each of these three 
efforts aims to be sustainable . They must be: (1) effective—
they work for all stakeholders with little complication; 
(2)  synergistic—they maximize benefits for local people 
and nonhuman entities; and (3)  equitable—they narrow 
disparities between poor and rich . Specifically, to achieve 
sustainability over the duration of a nonzero-sum program, 
any environmental law should be implemented in a deeply 
equitable way .
By “deep equity,” I refer to laws, policies, and values 
promoting sustainable pathways that act in synergy to 
maximize the health and potential of all individuals, com-
munities, and ecosystems . The equity is “deep” because 
values become rooted within each individual, and because 
equity requires that we fundamentally re-imagine our 
community structures and responsibilities, and that we 
root these values and responsibilities in our legal systems 
and policy choices . Our laws and policies would, in turn, 
support values and actions promoting even deeper equity .
To make a deeply equitable world, we should abandon 
the dualisms of zero-sum environmentalism and expand 
both the currencies with which we calculate “winners and 
losers” and our notions of who the short- and long-term 
beneficiaries really are . While the devil always lies in the 
fine print of how programs are implemented in law and in 
practice, if done well, REDD+, biodiversity offsetting, and 
managing water as ecological infrastructure can all lead 
us away from dualistic zero-sum thinking about environ-
mental problems and lead us to more holistic, equitable 
visions of a shared future on a sustainable planet . While 
that planet will continue to be a reservoir of ecological 
resources for humans to exploit to fulfill our needs and 
desires, it will also be one that stewards ecological function 
and the evolutionary process, and sustains the majestic, 
nonhuman world .
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V. Beyond Zero-Sum Thinking for 
Environmental Law
This section was authored by Keith Hirokawa, Associate 
Professor of Law, Albany Law School.
The issue addressed here—zero-sum thinking and its 
application to environmental law—questions whether 
environmental quality is appropriately characterized as a 
zero-sum game in which regulation is an expensive, job-
destroying monster .15 Describing a choice as a zero-sum 
game can be insightful for understanding the architec-
ture of choice in a battle of particular circumstances . The 
notion of the zero-sum game comes from game theory and 
describes an “I win, you lose” (or vice versa) situation in 
which the amount you lose is proportional to my gains in 
winning . The game provides insights into how particular 
resolutions may have been predictable or even beneficial 
under the circumstances .
However, when posed as a zero-sum game, environ-
mental quality appears too costly: every dollar spent 
on the environment takes food from the table of some 
employee . Aside from the problem that the zero-sum 
characterization is seldom, if ever, an accurate description 
of environmental regulation, this zero-sum framing pre-
sumes that environmental values are somehow divorced 
from economic livelihoods .
Ecological economist Gretchen Daily defines “ecosys-
tem services” as the “wide range of conditions and processes 
through which natural ecosystems, and the species that are 
part of them, help sustain and fulfill human life .”16 In addi-
tion to the goods (food, timber, etc .) produced in the envi-
ronment, functioning ecosystems supply essential services, 
including drinkable water and breathable air, biodiversity, 
habitable climate circumstances, and even spiritual and 
culturally significant experiences .17 Of course, because the 
services provided by functioning ecosystems are often not 
exchanged in the marketplace, they have been routinely 
ignored and undervalued .18 The study of ecosystem services 
15 . As noted in the dissenting opinion to Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 681 F .3d 1006, 42 ELR 20116 (9th Cir . 2012) (Smith, J ., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 2013 U .S . LEXIS 2256 (U .S ., Mar . 18, 2013):
a number of people will lose their jobs and the businesses that have 
invested in the equipment used will lose much of their value .  .  .  . 
No legislature or regulatory agency would enact sweeping rules that 
create such economic chaos, shutter entire industries, and cause 
thousands of people to lose their jobs .
 Id . (objecting to the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
to require §7 consultation under the ESA for Notice of Intent to operate 
mining operations in the Klamath River Basin) .
16 . Gretchen Daily et al ., Ecosystem Services: Benefits Supplied to Human Societies 
by Natural Ecosystems, 2 Issues Ecology 1, 2 (1997); Robert Costanza 
et al ., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 
Nature 253, 253 (1997); Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems 
and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, at v (2005) .
17 . U .S . EPA Science Advisory Board, Valuing the Protection of Ecological 
Systems and Services 8 (EPA-SAB-09-012) (May 2009), available at http://
www .epa .gov/ecology/publications .htm .
18 . James Salzman et al ., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, 
and Law, 20 Stan . Envtl . L .J . 309, 311 (2001); Keith H . Hirokawa 
& Elizabeth J . Porter, Aligning Regulation With the Informational Need: 
illustrates the manner in which ecosystem processes have 
real value according to the benefits provided .19
The ecosystem services approach helps to overcome 
zero-sum rhetoric in at least three ways:
(1) More and better information. Valuing the envi-
ronment as a provider of services recasts the prob-
lem of environmental degradation as one that can 
be calculated .20 Viewing the environment as ser-
vices also helps in identifying the types of informa-
tion needed to solve environmental problems, such 
as baseline information on environmental function 
and the potential of conservation and resiliency 
planning to secure the continuing receipt of eco-
system benefits . By prioritizing this information, 
ecosystem services analysis helps to calculate the 
cost of losing ecosystem function by revealing the 
direct and indirect benefits people and communi-
ties receive from the environment .
(2) Willingness to pay . Ecosystem services requires an 
appraisal of ecosystem functionality . This approach 
helps explain why the interruption of ecosystem 
process (by transformation, degradation, or dis-
placement) results in real losses to human well-
being . Typically, our reliance on and need for 
particular ecosystem functions is undervalued until 
we experience changes in the environment . Once 
essential ecosystem services are diminished or lost, 
we understand their value as a cost of finding sub-
stitute services: clean water, clean air, water quality 
control facilities, and so on .21 Likewise, information 
regarding the flow of ecosystem benefits provides an 
understanding of human well-being that identifies 
people as the beneficiaries of environmental quality 
and supports protection of ecosystem function as an 
investment that yields great returns .
(3) Availability of win-win-win alternatives. To see 
an alternative in which everyone wins is not to force 
an exception or search for an outlier . The winning 
alternative is almost always available and, when 
promoted as such, can be very persuasive . Recent 
examples include green building (which not only 
drives innovation and development, but produces 
healthier, longer lasting structures); renewable 
energy development (driving technological devel-
opments to produce cheaper, cleaner energy); and 
Ecosystem Services and the Next Generation of Environmental Law, 46 Akron 
L . Rev . 963 (2013) .
19 . Costanza et al ., supra note 16, at 253 .
20 . David Batker et al ., Gaining Ground—Wetlands, Hurricanes and the 
Economy: The Value of Restoring the Mississippi River Delta 21 (2010), 
available at http://www .eartheconomics .org/FileLibrary/file/Reports/
Louisiana/Earth_Economics_Report_on_the_Mississippi_River_Delta_
compressed .pdf (“Ecosystem service valuation assigns a dollar value to 
goods and services provided by a given ecosystem . This allows for proposed 
management policies to be considered in terms of their ability to improve 
ecological processes that produce the full diversity of valuable ecosystem 
goods and services .”) .
21 . Costanza et al ., supra note 16, at 255 .
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energy- and water-efficient products (products that 
demand fewer resources in design, construction, 
and operation) . Better calculations of ecosystem 
services facilitate a conversation about cooperation, 
complementary values, and co-benefits, revealing 
that sound environmental choices do not result in 
“I win, you lose .” For instance, an assessment of 
urban tree functions shows that trees in urban areas 
provide services (shade and climate control, water 
filtering, stormwater capture) that offer significant 
benefits at a minimal cost for installation and main-
tenance . In comparison, construction and mainte-
nance of the grey infrastructure alternatives (A/C 
systems, water filtration plants, stormwater control 
facilities) are expensive to construct and maintain .
Zero-sum descriptions can be useful . However, they may 
also misdirect our attention in matters of environmental 
decisionmaking, and to that extent, thinking about envi-
ronmental problems in zero-sum stories is short-sighted . 
Communities that investigate the alternatives created by 
ecosystem services have made efficient, valuable choices 
that will contribute to community well-being in significant 
ways . Watershed planning for water supply in New York 
City, urban forest planning in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
and wetlands planning in Portland, Oregon, have proven 
that ecosystems serve human well-being in essential ways . 
Win-win-win alternatives are found in functioning ecosys-
tems . We only need to see ecosystems as opportunities .
VI. Zero-Sum Environmental Governance
This section was authored by Shannon Roesler, Professor of 
Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
The political climate that facilitated the passage of major 
pollution-control statutes, such as the CAA and the CWA, 
may seem difficult to imagine today . When the U .S . 
Congress passed the major pollution-control laws in the 
1970s, it was responding to a growing consensus that fed-
eral environmental regulations were essential to protection 
of human health and the environment . In their absence, 
many feared that states would engage in a “race to the bot-
tom,” setting lax environmental regulations in an effort to 
attract industry and economic growth . Policymakers also 
recognized that environmental pollution increasingly pre-
sented problems of scale; pollutants emitted into the air 
and discharged into water bodies did not always remain 
within the political borders of a state . A federal role was 
perceived as a necessary means to ensure the efficient regu-
lation of interstate pollution .
Today, political support for new environmental regu-
lations at the federal level appears less uniform, particu-
larly given the resistance to federal regulation by a sizeable 
number of states . Along with industry, states now rou-
tinely file lawsuits challenging new environmental regu-
lations as abuses of federal power . Instead of thinking 
seriously about shared governance, the political default 
in many states is to litigate with the hope of invalidating 
the federal rule .
This turns environmental governance into a zero-sum 
jurisdictional game; if the federal rule is invalidated, the 
state wins, and if it stands, the state loses . When states 
treat environmental governance as a zero-sum game, they 
preclude the consideration of win-win scenarios . Along the 
way, time, effort, and money are wasted in protracted legal 
battles that delay important protections for human health 
and the environment .
Somewhat ironically, today’s landscape of state-federal 
litigation takes place against a model of shared state-fed-
eral governance . Every student of federal pollution-con-
trol laws learns that they depend on a regulatory model 
often called “cooperative federalism .” Under this model, 
the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses its 
rulemaking authority to set minimum standards limiting 
the release of harmful pollutants into the environment, 
and state-level agencies typically implement and enforce 
these standards through permit processes . States also have 
some flexibility in deciding how to implement standards 
and meet other federal requirements . For example, under 
the CAA program that establishes ambient air quality 
standards for certain harmful pollutants, like carbon 
monoxide and ground-level ozone,22 states draft their own 
state implementation plans for meeting these standards . 
State policymakers therefore have an opportunity to tailor 
their emission-control policies to fit their economic and 
social needs .
This model is theoretically “cooperative” because it 
depends on voluntary cooperation by state governments . 
States implement CAA and CWA permitting and enforce-
ment because they prefer to have control over these pro-
cesses, and often receive federal money and assistance in 
return . But if states opt out (or fail to meet the federal 
requirements), the federal government can step in and 
implement the regulatory program at issue, an arrange-
ment often called conditional preemption .
Despite this cooperative model, the current litiga-
tion practices of some states tell an uncooperative—even 
hostile—story . Consider Texas . According to the Texas 
Tribune,23 the state of Texas sued the Barack Obama 
Administration at least 48 times . In over one-half of these 
cases, Texas challenged EPA action regarding air and water 
quality standards . A sizeable subset of these lawsuits (eight) 
involves climate change regulation . The total bill for these 
challenges adds up to over $1 .8 million .
Texas is not, of course, the only state to challenge fed-
eral environmental laws . Since EPA issued its Clean Power 
Plan (CPP) last year, more than one-half of the states, 
along with utilities, energy companies, and other indus-
try and labor groups, have filed dozens of lawsuits alleging 
that EPA’s plan for reducing carbon emissions from power 
22 . See U .S . EPA, Criteria Air Pollutants, available at https://www .epa .gov/
criteria-air-pollutants .
23 . See Neena Satija et al ., Texas v. the Feds—A Look at the Lawsuits, Tex . Trib .,
Jan . 17, 2017, https://www .texastribune .org/2017/01/17/texas-federal- 
government-lawsuits/ .
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plants violates the CAA and unconstitutionally intrudes 
upon the states’ authority to set energy policy .24 (These 
suits are now part of consolidated litigation before the U .S . 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D .C .) Cir-
cuit .) The CPP sets emissions targets for each state, with 
the goal of achieving a 32% reduction from 2005 levels by 
2030 .25 After the U .S . Supreme Court made the unusual 
decision to stay EPA’s plan last spring, 19 states suspended 
their planning processes under the CPP, further delaying 
meaningful planning for emissions reductions and threat-
ening to undermine U .S . compliance with the Paris cli-
mate change agreement .26 Notably, states are divided on 
the issue; 18 states, along with various local governments, 
nonprofits, and industry groups, have filed briefs in sup-
port of the plan .27
Roughly as many states28 also challenged EPA and the 
U .S . Army Corps of Engineers’ (the Corps’) 2015 Clean 
Water Rule, a regulation that seeks to clarify which water 
bodies and wetlands are covered by the CWA .29 Supreme 
Court opinions regarding the relevant CWA language 
are splintered and leave many questions unanswered . In 
the Clean Water Rule, EPA and the Corps attempted to 
make their approach to CWA jurisdiction more predictable 
and transparent . But rather than waiting to see how the 
Clean Water Rule would function in practice, many states 
jumped to the zero-sum strategy: sue to invalidate . In liti-
gation against both the Clean Water Rule and the CPP, 
states have argued that federal regulation unconstitution-
ally alters the state-federal balance of power by expanding 
federal regulatory power into areas traditionally regulated 
by the states .
Significantly, this zero-sum view of environmental 
governance is not confined to the offices of state attor-
neys general . Legislators in several states have introduced 
bills and resolutions that suspend state planning efforts 
under the CPP or characterize the plan as an abuse of 
federal power . For example, a resolution introduced in 
the Arizona Legislature calls on the state governor and 
attorney general to defend the state against “overreach-
ing regulations .”30
Some states may have valid objections to aspects of the 
CPP and the Clean Water Rule . The critical question, how-
ever, is whether a zero-sum litigation strategy is the best 
24 . See E&E’s Power Plan Hub, E&E News, http://www .eenews .net/interactive/
clean_power_plan .
25 . Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources, Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed . Reg . 64661 (Oct . 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 
C .F .R . pt . 60) .
26 . See E&E’s Power Plan Hub, Supreme Court Stay Response, E&E News, http://
www .eenews .net/interactive/clean_power_plan#planning_status_chart .
27 . See Clean Power Plan in the Courts, Battle Lines, E&E News, http://www .
eenews .net/interactive/clean_power_plan/fact_sheets/legal_battle_lines .
28 . See Timothy Cama, 27 States Challenge Obama Water Rule in Court, The Hill, 
June 30, 2015, http://thehill .com/policy/energy-environment/246539-27-
states-challenge-obama-water-rule-in-court .
29 . Clean Water Rule, Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed . Reg . 
37053 (June 29, 2015) .
30 . See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, States’ Reactions to EPA 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, Apr . 18, 2016, available at http://www .
ncsl .org/research/energy/states-reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gas-
emissions-standards635333237 .aspx .
way to resolve these concerns . Consistent with the CAA’s 
shared governance structure, the CPP recognizes that states 
will need time to develop emissions-reduction plans; it also 
allows states flexibility in how they meet their reduction 
targets and recognizes the role of interstate cooperation 
through regional trading plans . In the absence of compre-
hensive federal climate legislation, the CPP is at present the 
only realistic road toward meeting our national responsi-
bility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . Litigation is only 
delaying meaningful action .
Moreover, even if states “win” the jurisdictional battle, 
the victory will be costly . In addition to litigation costs, 
states may lose opportunities to shape national environ-
mental policy and to mitigate costly environmental and 
public health risks . As the “cooperative” ideal of environ-
mental federalism recognizes, environmental regulation 
should not be a zero-sum game .
Of course, the nature of cooperative (or competitive) 
federalism shifts with each administration’s regulatory 
agenda . President Trump chose Oklahoma Attorney Gen-
eral Scott Pruitt as his EPA Administrator, a choice the 
U .S . Senate recently confirmed . As reported in the New 
York Times and elsewhere, Pruitt has helped lead the coali-
tion of Republican attorneys general in their zero-sum 
litigation of federal environmental regulations, including 
the CPP .31 After serving as EPA Administrator for just 
over two weeks, he publicly questioned the scientific con-
sensus that emissions of greenhouse gases are “a primary 
contributor” to global warming .32 In addition, President 
Trump has already directed EPA to begin the long process 
of rewriting the Clean Water Rule, and he is expected to 
sign an executive order regarding the CPP .33 Pruitt will 
oversee administrative efforts to dismantle these and 
other regulations .
We may soon see some states play a very different role: 
one designed to defend EPA and cooperative federal-
ism . States that acted early to curb carbon emissions, for 
example, are likely to oppose federal efforts to reconsider 
regulations and climate policies . But these kinds of court 
challenges are not examples of zero-sum strategies . Instead, 
they are efforts to preserve the basic architecture of envi-
ronmental law, a structure that promotes jurisdictional 
pluralism without jeopardizing minimum standards and 
international commitments .
31 . See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, Trump Picks Scott Pruitt, Climate 
Change Denialist, to Lead EPA, N .Y . Times (Dec . 7, 2016), https://www .
nytimes .com/2016/12/07/us/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-trump .html?_r=0 .
32 . See Coral Davenport, EPA Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change, 
N .Y . Times (Mar . 9, 2017), https://www .nytimes .com/2017/03/09/us/
politics/epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming .html .
33 . See Coral Davenport, Trump Order Will Aim to Roll Back a Clean Water 
Rule, N .Y . Times (Feb . 27, 2017), https://www .nytimes .com/2017/02/27/
us/politics/trump-clean-water-epa .html .
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VII. Zero-Sum Games in Pollution Control: 
The Games We Create Versus the 
Games We Discover
This section was authored by Robin Kundis Craig, James I. 
Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law, University of 
Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.
Environmental pollution lands us in zero-sum games .34 
The more interesting question is: Do we discover these 
games? Or do we invent them? In other words, are there 
hard environmental limits on how much anthropogenic 
pollution natural systems can absorb, which we eventually 
discover? Or do we create zero-sum games for pollution 
purely because of our own goals for both ecosystems and 
SESs (a recognition that human societies are both part of 
and depend upon functioning ecosystems)? In fact, we do 
both, and the intersection of the two in a climate-change 
era is worth examination .
There is no doubt that natural systems respond to, and 
can be altered by, human pollution, and at all sorts of 
scales . The emerging discipline of resilience theory posits 
that ecosystems can exist in alternative stable states and 
that they transform from one state to another by crossing 
an ecological threshold .35 While resilience theory imposes no 
normative value on these alternative states,36 as a pragmatic 
matter, humans tend to find one state more desirable than 
the others . Relatedly, and importantly, crossing an ecologi-
cal threshold in one direction is often easier than reversing 
the process . Thus, when ecosystems are in human-desired 
states, keeping that system from crossing an ecological 
threshold in the first place is often far less costly than try-
ing to restore the ecosystem afterward . Thus, identifying 
ecological thresholds and the most desirable of alternative 
states can help to inform legal and policy goals .
Pollution often prompts one of the most common 
ecological transformations—namely, the eutrophication 
of water bodies as a result of excess nutrient (nitrogen 
and phosphorus) pollution .37 Eutrophication transforms 
aquatic ecosystems from clear, oxygenated, and often 
cooler waters that can support a variety of plant and animal 
species to ecosystems dominated by algae, hypoxic (low-
oxygen), or anoxic (no-oxygen) warmer water, with greatly 
34 . John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed the concept of zero-
sum games as part of their invention of game theory . Thomas S . Ferguson, 
Game Theory II-4 (UCLA Department of Mathematics 2011) . In game 
theory, a zero-sum game is one in which no wealth is created or destroyed; 
one person’s gain must result in another person’s (or persons’) loss to the 
same amount or degree . Id . More colloquially, zero-sum games can be 
viewed as problems where there is a single unchanging “pie” of resources 
and several people are seeking to increase the size of their slice; they can only 
do so by decreasing the amount of pie available to everyone else .
35 . Lance H . Gunderson & Crawford S . Holling, Panarchy: 
Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems 34 
(2001) .
36 . Brian Walker & David Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustaining 
Ecosystems and People in a Changing World 7-9 (2006) .
37 . Ocean Service Education, Nutrient Pollution—Eutrophication, NOAA, http://
oceanservice .noaa .gov/education/kits/estuaries/media/supp_estuar09b_ 
eutro .html (revised Mar . 25, 2008) .
reduced biodiversity .38 Moreover, once an aquatic system 
has become eutrophic, restoring it to its previous and often 
more productive ecosystem state can be very difficult .39
Thus, eutrophication thresholds could be considered to 
define a zero-sum pollution game that we have discovered . 
Specifically, if we are pursuing a normative goal of keeping 
an aquatic system in its non-eutrophic state (which is, in 
fact, what people usually want), the aquatic system’s capac-
ity to absorb nutrients without transforming defines a lim-
ited pollution “pie” for achieving that governance goal . If 
polluters have reached this capacity, no polluter can increase 
its nutrient pollution without either another polluter hav-
ing to reduce its pollution or the system transforming .
The entire planet may also be limited in how much pol-
lution of various sorts it can absorb without transforming 
into—well, something radically different than the planet 
we and our hominid relatives have enjoyed for the last 
12,000 years during the Holocene . In Big World, Small 
Planet: Abundance Within Planetary Boundaries, Johan 
Rockström and Mattias Klum describe the Planetary 
Boundaries Project .40 This project is the effort of a team 
of scientists to identify key planetary boundaries—param-
eters that, if exceeded, risk transforming the entire Earth 
and its ecosystems .41 In its 2014 update to the original 
2009 research, the team identified nine such planetary 
boundaries .42 Three of these—the “Big Three”—reflect 
“processes with sharply defined global thresholds” that are 
“hard-wired into the Earth system and cannot be shifted 
by human actions,” processes that “are capable of sharp 
shifts from one state to another, with direct implications 
for the entire planet .”43
These Big Three planetary boundaries are climate 
change, stratospheric ozone depletion, and ocean acidifi-
cation .44 Notably, the planet is at risk of crossing all three 
of these boundaries because of human pollution—respec-
tively, greenhouse gases, ozone-depleting chemicals, and 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide .45 In addition, the risks of 
exceeding three other planetary boundaries—biochemi-
cal flows (nutrient cycles), atmospheric aerosol loading, 
and novel entities (toxics)—are directly related to anthro-
pogenic pollution, with the scientists concluding in 2014 
that we are already at high risk of exceeding the phos-
phorus and nitrogen limits .46 (The other three planetary 
boundaries are biodiversity, freshwater consumption, and 
land use change .)47
38 . Id .
39 . Stephen R . Carpenter, Eutrophication of Aquatic Systems: Bistability and 
Soil Phosphorus, 102, No . 29 Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (PNAS) 10002-05 (July 19, 2005), available at http://www .pnas .
org/content/102/29/10002 .full .pdf .
40 . Johan Rockström & Mattias Klum, Big World, Small Planet: 
Abundance Within Planetary Boundaries 64-77 (2015) .
41 . Id . at 64 .
42 . Id. at 65 fig . 2 .1 .
43 . Id . at 69 .
44 . Id .
45 . Id . at 65 fig . 2 .1 .
46 . Id .
47 . Id .
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One way of interpreting the results of the Planetary 
Boundaries Project, therefore, is that we have discovered 
that much pollution is, ultimately, a zero-sum game at 
the planetary scale—at least if we want to avoid trans-
forming the Earth into a very different state of being, 
one that is probably far less hospitable to the current 
forms of life existing here (including us) . There is decent 
evidence that if people and governments believe and 
appreciate the systemic risks from pollution, they even-
tually will act (at least so far as the capacity to act exists) 
to reduce those risks, particularly if they can do so rela-
tively cheaply and easily .
For example, scientists discovered a recurring hole in the 
atmospheric ozone layer in 1984 and published their results 
in Nature in May 1985 .48 By September 1987, the world’s 
nations had agreed to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
That Deplete the Ozone Layer, a treaty that phased out 
the production and consumption of many ozone-deplet-
ing chemicals .49 In June 2016, scientists reported that the 
ozone hole is starting to “heal .”50 Thus, stratospheric ozone 
depletion is one pollution-related planetary boundary from 
which the world appears to be retreating .
However, not all zero-sum pollution games result from 
“discovered” natural limits of ecological thresholds and 
planetary boundaries . Instead, some of these games reflect 
human regulatory choices about the environmental quality 
that we desire . For example, the United States and Canada 
noticed acid rain problems in the 1960s and 1970s .51 Acid 
rain was clearly affecting ecosystems such as maple forests 
and lakes in both countries52; whether it was driving them 
toward ecological thresholds and transformations is a far 
more open question .
Nevertheless, in 1990, Congress amended the CAA 
to impose a comprehensive “cap-and-trade” program for 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, effectively creating a 
regulatory zero-sum game for emissions of these pollut-
ants .53 In 1991, Canada and the United States entered into 
a treaty to address acid rain, effectively extending the cap-
and-trade concept across national boundaries .54 Cap-and-
trade programs are regulatory zero-sum games: The “cap” 
sets the total amount of pollution allowed (the “pie”), while 
the trading reflects the fact that one polluter’s need to emit 
beyond its assigned allowance must be matched by another 
48 . Joseph C . Farman et al ., Large Losses of Total Ozone in Antarctica Reveal 
Seasonal ClO
x
/NO
x
 Interaction, 315 Nature 207-10 (1985) .
49 . United Nations, International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer: 16 
September, http://www .un .org/en/events/ozoneday/background .shtml (last 
visited Jan . 25, 2017) .
50 . Aaron Sidder, Remember the Ozone Hole? Now There’s Proof That It’s Healing,
Nat’l Geographic (June 30, 2016), available at http://news .national
geographic .com/2016/06/antarctic-ozone-hole-healing-fingerprints/ .
51 . Gene E . Likens & Richard T . Holmes, The Discovery of Acid Rain, Yale 
Books Unbound (May 4, 2016), http://blog .yupnet .org/2016/05/04/
discovery-acid-rain/ (May 4, 2016) .
52 . Id .
53 . Pub . L . No . 101-549, Title IV, 104 Stat . 2584 (Nov . 15, 1990) .
54 . Environment and Climate Change Canada, Canada-United States Air 
Quality Agreement, Government of Canada, https://www .ec .gc .ca/air/
default .asp?lang=En&n=83930AC3-1 (as viewed Jan . 26, 2017) . The treaty 
itself is available at http://www .ijc .org/rel/agree/air .html .
polluter’s (or polluters’) willingness to reduce its (their) 
emissions below those allowances .55
Water pollution in the United States is also subject to 
regulatory zero-sum games, in the form of the CWA’s total 
maximum daily load (TMDL) requirements .56 The TMDL 
is the total amount of a pollutant that a water body can 
take in on a daily basis without violating its state-defined 
water quality standards .57 These water quality standards 
reflect both the uses of the water body that were present 
in 1972 and the state’s as-yet-unattained use goals for that 
water body, with a general national goal that all water bod-
ies should be fishable and swimmable .58 Thus, with few 
exceptions, states do not set water quality standards to 
reflect actual ecological thresholds, but rather the uses that 
exist or can be restored within the current system state .59
As such, water quality standards and the TMDLs that 
result from them are not “discovered” zero-sum pollution 
games . Instead, TMDLs, like cap-and-trade programs, 
are regulatory zero-sum games created to achieve human-
defined pollution reduction goals . The total amount of pol-
lutant allowed under the TMDL is divided among natural 
background sources and human sources of the pollutant, 
requiring human sources that exceed their assigned allow-
ance to reduce their pollutant contribution levels .60 EPA 
and the states are also beginning to experiment with water 
quality trading for certain pollutants,61 providing a market-
based method for polluters to adjust their individual pollu-
tion levels under the TMDL—but the market only works 
because the TMDL creates a legal zero-sum pollution game .
In the absence of clearly stated environmental quality 
goals—national ambient air quality standards under the 
CAA,62 water quality standards under the CWA63—and 
a regulatory program for achieving them, humans tend 
to operate as if pollution is not a zero-sum game right up 
until the point where they push a system across a threshold 
or boundary . As a result, ambient environmental quality 
goals and regulatory zero-sum games—the zero-sum pol-
lution games that we invent—can keep us from having to 
discover that pollution is a zero-sum game at a larger scale 
(at least to the extent that we want to avoid ecosystem and 
planetary transformations) . Moreover, given that it is often 
hard to fight our way back when we hit those limits—it 
has taken almost three decades for the ozone hole to begin 
55 . Rosaly Byrd & Laurèn Demates, An Introduction to Cap-and-Trade Systems 
Around the World, Huffington Post (Feb . 24, 2016), http://www .
huffingtonpost .com/rosaly-byrd/an-introduction-to-carbon-cap-and-trade_ 
b_6737660 .html .
56 . 33 U .S .C . §1313(d) .
57 . U .S . EPA, Implementing Clean Water Act Section 303(d): Impaired Waters 
and Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), https://www .epa .gov/tmdl (last 
updated Sept . 21, 2016) .
58 . 33 U .S .C . §1313(c); 40 C .F .R . §131 .3(i) .
59 . See What Are Water Quality Standards?, U .S . EPA, https://www .epa .
gov/standards-water-body-health/what-are-water-quality-standards (last 
updated Nov . 3, 2016) (describing how states set water quality standards) .
60 . 40 C .F .R . §130 .2(i) .
61 . Frequently Asked Questions About Water Quality Trading, U .S . EPA, https://
www .epa .gov/npdes/frequently-asked-questions-about-water-quality-
trading (last updated July 8, 2016) .
62 . 42 U .S .C . §7409 .
63 . 33 U .S .C . §1313(c) .
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to respond to the Montreal Protocol, and many eutrophic 
water bodies remain transformed—the concepts of eco-
logical thresholds and planetary boundaries suggest that 
defining more regulatory zero-sum pollution games might 
help us to define and stay within safe operating spaces for 
human activity (assuming our science is good enough to 
identify those boundaries and thresholds accurately) .
Of course, the elephant in the room is climate change . 
Is climate change a zero-sum pollution game? The many 
debates over the “proper” target for atmospheric green-
house gas concentrations (350 parts per million of car-
bon dioxide, or 400, or 450) suggests that both climate 
change scientists and climate change activists perceive 
climate change to be zero-sum .64 Moreover, the politics of 
climate change mitigation negotiations are clearly driven 
by perceptions that parceling out emissions reduction com-
mitments and total emissions limits creates winners and 
losers—people who get more or less than their fair shares 
of a limited emissions “pie .”65
But climate change, as usual, is more complex than 
just the mitigation zero-sum game . The Planetary 
Boundaries Project scientists consider climate one of two 
“core” boundaries (biodiversity is the other), because 
the climate system has “a decisive role, on [its] own, in 
determining the outcome of the planetary state .”66 With 
respect to pollution, if the world refuses to acknowledge 
and play the climate change mitigation zero-sum game, 
the parameters of many of the other zero-sum pollution 
games are likely to change on us, calling into question 
the continued viability of the zero-sum pollution games 
we have created .
Many forms of pollution are sensitive to temperature,67 
for example, and climate change may make many of the 
environmental quality goals that bound regulatory zero-
sum games impossible to achieve—for example, ground-
level ozone goals,68 water temperature goals,69 ocean pH 
goals .70 Thus, climate change impacts push many ecosys-
tems, and perhaps the planet as a whole, toward transfor-
mation, and it is important to remember that the zero-sum 
64 . Arthur Neslen, Carbon Dioxide Levels in Atmosphere Forecast to Shatter 
Milestone, The Guardian (June 13, 2016, 11:41 PM), https://www .
theguardian .com/environment/2016/jun/13/carbon-dioxide-levels-in- 
atmosphere-forecast-to-shatter-milestone (discussing the 400 ppm and 
450 ppm thresholds, noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change has settled on the latter); 350 .org, The Science, available at 
https://350 .org/about/science/ (as viewed Jan . 25, 2017) (document its and 
Dr . James Hansen’s commitment to 350 ppm as a goal) .
65 . Most famously, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change sought to impose greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets on developed nations . United Nations, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, available at http://
unfccc .int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830 .php (as viewed Jan . 25, 2017) .
66 . Rockström & Klum, supra note 40, at 71 .
67 . Daniel J . Jacob & Darrell A . Winner, Effect of Climate Change on Air 
Quality, 43 Atmospheric Env’t 51, 54-55 (2009) .
68 . Id . at 60 .
69 . Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now 
What?, 1 Wash . & Lee J . Energy, Climate, & Env’t 9, 12, 19-20 (Spring 
2010) .
70 . Robin Kundis Craig, Dealing With Ocean Acidification: The Problem, the 
Clean Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches, 90 Wash . L . Rev . 1583, 
1612-27 (Dec . 2015) .
pollution games we invent are, ultimately, dependent on 
the zero-sum pollution games we discover .
VIII. Making Economic Development and 
Job Creation Drivers of Serious Action 
on Climate Change and Environmental 
Protection
This section was authored by John C. Dernbach, Common-
wealth Professor of Environmental Law and Sustainability 
and director of the Environmental Law and Sustainability 
Center at Widener University Commonwealth Law School.
We’re fighting for policy changes that will make it pos-
sible for us to have better choices; utilities that offer 
us renewable options, electric trains that make short-
haul flights obsolete, public transit . Exxon and its ilk 
have been fighting for decades to keep these choices 
out of our reach, and then claim that we are voting 
with our dollars every time we sit in traffic or heat our 
homes with fossil fuels supplied by a utility that has a 
monopoly . They can play gotcha as much as they want, 
but all it proves is how badly we need better options .71
             —Bill McKibben
One of the most long-standing narratives in environ-
mental law and politics is the alleged necessity of choosing 
between development and environment . The narrative per-
sists in industrial projects, dams, mines, shale-gas develop-
ment, highways, construction projects, and in a variety of 
other projects and activities . As Bill McKibben points out 
in the quote above, it also persists in the debate about what 
to do about climate change . In every case, some people win, 
and some people lose . The narrative, based on conventional 
development, has a built-in zero-sum game—development 
or environment .
A competing narrative, which has been slowly gain-
ing supporters over several decades, is built on the idea of 
sustainable development—development and environment . 
When there are attractive ways of making environmental 
protection and economic development mutually reinforc-
ing, there is a way of escaping the zero-sum framing of 
environmental issues, including climate change . As McK-
ibben says, people want better choices .
The conflict between these narratives goes to the heart 
of the divide on environmental policy between the national 
Republican Party (which tends to embrace conventional 
development and tends to see environmental programs as 
a diminution of national wealth) and the national Demo-
cratic Party (which, without a lot of fanfare, has tended 
to embrace sustainable development) . As of this writing, 
it appears that newly elected President Trump has begun, 
in the name of conventional development, to wreck much 
71 . Bill McKibben, Embarrassing Photos of Me, Thanks to My Right-Wing 
Stalkers, N .Y . Times, Aug . 5, 2016, available at http://www .nytimes .
com/2016/08/07/opinion/sunday/embarrassing-photos-of-me-thanks-to-
my-right-wing-stalkers .html?_r=0 .
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of the climate change and environmental law and pol-
icy that the Obama Administration built on sustainable 
development grounds . In the name of economic develop-
ment and job creation for fossil fuels, President Trump 
appears to be willing to destroy or weaken programs that 
build the economy and create the very jobs that he envi-
sions for the renewed America . The real choice, then, is 
not between development and the environment . The real 
choice is between conventional development and sustain-
able development .
The economic and job creation benefits of action on 
climate change, for example, can be enormous . The rap-
idly growing attractiveness of increased energy produc-
tivity (which measures the economic value created per 
unit of energy used) and renewable energy illustrate the 
point . Almost 900,000 workers spend more than one-half 
their time doing energy efficiency work . Energy efficiency 
companies expect that an additional 245,000 jobs will 
be created over the next year .72 Energy productivity also 
does something that fossil fuels can no longer consistently 
do; it saves people money . Doubling energy productivity 
would save the U .S . economy $327 billion annually after 
subtracting investment costs, and generate 1 .3 million 
new jobs .73
Renewable energy has reached grid parity in nearly the 
entire country, according to the U .S . Energy Information 
Administration74 as well as two investment banks, Lazard75 
and Deutsche Bank .76 That is, the life-cycle cost of electric-
ity from wind and solar is at or below the cost of electric-
ity from coal, nuclear, and gas, even without subsidies . As 
a result, jobs in wind and solar are growing rapidly . The 
total number of solar energy jobs (373,807) is more than 
twice the total number from mining and electrical genera-
tion from coal (160,119), and slightly more than the total 
from extraction and electrical generation from natural gas 
(362,118) .77 Another 101,738 persons work in the wind 
industry .78 In 2016, employment in the solar and wind 
industries grew by 25% percent and 32%, respectively .79 
These figures do not include the considerable benefits to 
72 . Environmental Entrepreneurs (E2) & E4TheFuture, Energy 
Efficiency Jobs in America: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Energy Efficiency Employment Across All 50 States 4 (2016), 
available at https://www .e2 .org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Energy
EfficiencyJobsInAmerica_FINAL .pdf .
73 . Alliance to Save Energy, American Energy Productivity: The Economic, 
Environmental, and Security Benefits of Unlocking Energy Efficiency 
9-10, 13-14 (2013), available at http://www .ase .org/sites/ase .org/files/rhg_
americanenergyproductivity_0 .pdf .
74 . U .S . Energy Information Administration, Levelized Cost and 
Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2016 at 6 (2016), available at http://www .eia .
gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation .pdf .
75 . Lazard, Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis—Version 9 .0 
at 2 (2015), available at https://www .lazard .com/media/2390/lazards-
levelized-cost-of-energy-analysis-90 .pdf .
76 . Deutsche Bank Markets Research, Industry: Solar 78-79 (2015), 
available at https://www .db .com/cr/en/docs/solar_report_full_length .pdf .
77 . U .S . Dep’t of Energy, U .S . Energy and Employment Report 29 (2017), 
available at https://www .energy .gov/sites/prod/files/2016/03/f30/U .S .%20
Energy%20and%20Employment%20Report .pdf .
78 . Id.
79 . Id. at 8 .
the United States of global action on climate change80 or 
the enormous costs of not acting .81
If properly and forcefully advocated and understood, 
economics and job creation could change the narrative of 
development or environment that the Trump Administra-
tion appears to embrace . Environmental protection and 
climate change were not major issues in the 2016 election, 
and the political truth may be that the electorate is inter-
ested in economic development and job creation no matter 
what the source of, or driving force for, these jobs . Thus, 
economic development and job creation need to be under-
stood as drivers for action on climate change and environ-
mental protection, and not simply forces to be blunted . 
Economic development, in fact, has been a principal rea-
son for many of the environmental protection laws that 
have been adopted in the United States over the last several 
decades—including those for renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, recycling, and organic food .82 Making economic 
development and job creation a driver for serious action on 
climate change and environmental protection, of course, 
subverts the conventional development model .
The conventional development model on which the first 
narrative builds has had large global consequences, both 
positive and negative . It can be described like this:
Conventional Development
Progress Price of Progress
•	Peace and security
•	Economic development
•	Social development/ human 
rights/healthy communities
•	Environment and natural 
resources
•	Living people who depend 
on environment and natural 
resources who are harmed 
(health, property, etc.)
•	Future generations that are 
harmed
Conventional development, or simply development, is 
built on the idea of maximizing peace and security as well 
as economic and social development . It was given consid-
erable impetus by a variety of treaties and international 
institutions created at the end of World War II, and is 
directed at improving human freedom, opportunity, and 
quality of life .83 The model has worked in many ways; there 
has not been a third world war; the global economy has 
grown considerably; and people are living longer, tend to 
be healthier, and are better educated . Most of us would call 
that progress .
80 . U .S . Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change in the 
United States: Benefits of Global Action (2015), available at https://
www .epa .gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/cirareport .pdf .
81 . Marshall Burke et al ., Global Non-Linear Effect of Temperature on Economic 
Production, 527 Nature 235 (2015) (concluding that unmitigated warming 
is likely to reduce average global incomes by 23% by 2100) .
82 . John C . Dernbach, Creating the Law of Environmentally Sustainable 
Economic Development, 28 Pace Envtl . L . Rev . 614 (2011) .
83 . John C . Dernbach & Federico Cheever, Sustainable Development and 
Its Discontents, 4 Transnat’l Envtl . L . 247, 256-61 (2015); John C . 
Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 
49 Case W . Res . L . Rev . 1, 8-32 (1998) .
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But the model comes with a price, and it begins (but 
does not end) with widespread and growing environmen-
tal degradation, including climate disruption . Simply put, 
the model is based on an approach to decisionmaking that 
treats the environment as secondary in importance or as 
an afterthought . If it were just about the environment 
alone, that would be bad enough . But nearly all damage 
to the environment also hurts other humans in some way, 
sooner or later—through air or water pollution, disrupted 
communities, and the many ways in which a changing 
climate is already making life harder and more expensive . 
And many of the people who will be harmed have not yet 
been born .
Conventional development, then, comes with a built-
in trade off . It can only be justified in utilitarian terms; 
in environmental and human rights terms, conventional 
development asks too much . By benefiting some people 
at the expense of others, conventional development is 
also inequitable . The utilitarian calculus, moreover, only 
works if the benefits outweigh the costs, and many of 
the environmental and human costs are not, or cannot 
be, calculated . Finally, any system with such substantial 
built-in costs is an inefficient way of improving overall 
human well-being .
The basic idea behind sustainable development is to 
transform development, not simply to relabel it—to 
move from “development or environment” to “develop-
ment and environment .”
Sustainable development can be depicted as follows:
Sustainable Development
Progress
•	Peace and security
•	Economic development
•	Social development/ human rights/healthy communities
•	Environment and natural resources protection and restoration
Essentially, sustainable development moves environ-
ment and natural resources from the “price of progress” 
column into the “progress” column . Because the adverse 
effects of environmental degradation tend to disappear as a 
result, there is no need for the “price of progress” column . 
Sustainable development is also directed at human free-
dom, opportunity, and quality of life, but places greater 
emphasis on future generations .
In any given sustainable development context, from 
specific projects or activities to national plans and policies, 
decisionmakers are to integrate environmental consider-
ations and goals into the decisions they make . Sustain-
able development provides a framework for creating new 
approaches that produce both environmental and devel-
opment benefits, and encourages a more aggressive use of 
legal and policy tools that had been often considered of 
marginal value . Energy-efficiency standards adopted or 
strengthened in the United States since 2009 for appli-
ances such as clothes washers and air conditioners, for 
instance, are projected to save consumers more than $540 
billion by 2030 .84 U .S . government-funded research and 
development—another tool that is often overlooked—has 
played a substantial role in reducing solar energy costs and 
thus increasing global demand for solar energy .85 Both of 
these advance equity because they reduce the amount of 
money that people, especially poor and low-income peo-
ple, need to spend on energy . Sustainable development 
thus provides a way for public and private decisionmakers 
in all countries to get past the apparent conflict between 
development and environment .
These new approaches are increasingly evident in a 
variety of contexts, including business and industry, 
higher education, local governance and sustainability, and 
brownfields redevelopment,86 but progress thus far has 
been slow and uneven .87 Where progress has occurred, a 
key factor is that sustainable development generally pro-
duces greater net benefits than conventional development . 
These benefits include higher quality of life, reduced costs, 
and economic development .88 The sustainable develop-
ment framework can also generate a variety of economic, 
social, and environmental benefits; not just one type of 
benefit (primarily economic) .
In addition, the total economic, social, and environ-
mental outcomes of a project or activity animated by 
sustainability are likely to be greater than they would be 
if these outcomes offset each other in major ways (e .g ., 
when the economic development benefits of a project or 
activity are offset to some degree by its environmental and 
human costs) . For all the benefits that coal has brought 
to the national economy over two centuries, for example, 
air pollution from coal fired-power plants (sulfur dioxide, 
nitrous oxide, and particulates) caused $62 billion in pub-
lic health damage and significant premature human mor-
tality in 2007, even after more than three decades of air 
pollution control .89
The critical point, in other words, is that sustainable 
development can produce greater net economic benefits 
than conventional development, and can also provide a 
range of social and environmental benefits . These benefits, 
as McKibben points out, include choices that people want, 
like renewable energy and public transit . Sustainable devel-
opment also provides a more politically compelling frame 
for justifying serious action on climate change than per-
haps any other possible frame . For more than two decades, 
84 . U .S . Department of Energy, Saving Energy and Money With 
Appliance and Equipment Standards in the United States (2016), 
available at http://energy .gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f29/Appliance%20
Standards%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%202-17-2016 .pdf .
85 . The White House, United States Mid-Century Strategy for Deep 
Decarbonization 35 (2016), available at http://unfccc .int/files/focus/
long-term_strategies/application/pdf/us_mid_century_strategy .pdf .
86 . John C . Dernbach et al ., Progress Toward Sustainability: A Report Card, in 
Agenda for a Sustainable America 16 (Dernbach ed . 2009) .
87 . John C . Dernbach et al ., Acting as if Tomorrow Matters: 
Accelerating the Transition to Sustainability 9 (2012) .
88 . Id. at 289-90 .
89 . Committee on Health, Environmental, and Other External 
Costs and Benefits of Energy Production and Consumption & 
National Research Council, Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced 
Consequences of Energy Production and Use 6, 340 (2010) .
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
4-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 10343
both red and blue states have taken action to address cli-
mate change, primarily by fostering energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, through a variety of different legal tools, 
and they have done so primarily for economic develop-
ment, job creation, technological innovation, and social 
equity reasons .90 Similarly, the Obama Administration and 
others have justified action on climate change on economic 
development and job creation grounds .91 Profs . Hari Osof-
sky and Jacqueline Peel have synthesized a large body of 
psychological research and concluded that refocusing cli-
mate change efforts on economic development and disaster 
resilience is likely to provide a way of getting past partisan 
divisions on energy and climate change in many contexts .92
This approach is not a panacea; advocates of fossil fuels 
tend not to be interested in economic development in a 
broad sense; they are interested in economic development 
based on fossil fuels . Still, focusing on economic devel-
opment and job creation from energy productivity and 
renewable energy has a decent record of success . If we are 
to avoid the worst effects of climate change and protect 
the environment, we must use the sustainable development 
framework to give a higher priority to economic develop-
ment and job creation—starting now .
IX. Energy Policy: No Place for  
Zero-Sum Thinking
This section was authored by Inara Scott, Assistant Professor, 
College of Business, Oregon State University.
The popular notion of a zero-sum game is a scenario in 
which, for one party to gain value, another party must 
lose it . We can imagine a pie cut into six pieces, with six 
people standing beside it . For any one individual to get two 
pieces means someone else must go hungry . One of the key 
assumptions here, of course, is that the number of slices of 
pie is fixed . We cannot add to the pie .
Any simplistic metaphor is certain to break down under 
scrutiny, but in the energy context, this image is particu-
larly inapt . In December 2005, natural gas was trading 
around $15 .39 per million British thermal units . Today, 
the price is closer to $2 .90 .93 The reason for this precipitous 
drop? New techniques in fracking and horizontal drilling 
in shale rock, which allowed developers to shake loose mas-
sive stores of natural gas that had previously been inacces-
sible . The pie suddenly got a whole lot bigger .
Improvements in materials and efficiency have also dras-
tically lowered the cost of renewable energy generation—
so much so that current cost projections for 2020 are half 
what they were about a decade ago . The cost of wind energy 
90 . John Dernbach and the Widener University Law School Seminar on Global 
Warming, Moving the Climate Debate From Models to Proposed Legislation: 
Lessons From State Experience, 30 ELR 10933 (Nov . 2000) .
91 . Hari M . Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 Emory L .J . 
695, 726-29 (2016) .
92 . See id.
93 . Natural Gas, Trading Economics, http://www .tradingeconomics .com/
commodity/natural-gas (last visited Sept . 12, 2016) .
alone fell almost 60% from 2009-2015 .94 If we think of the 
pie as the amount of renewable energy we can generate per 
dollar, there can be no doubt it continues to grow .
Unfortunately, in the energy context, the pie can also 
shrink . The same shale gas that grew the natural gas 
pie could soon dry up, for regulatory or safety reasons . 
Fracking has been associated with an increase in earth-
quake activity .95 The controversial technique also uses 
significant amounts of groundwater (a touchy subject in 
drought-stricken areas, including California)96 and can 
contaminate groundwater with its dangerous mixture of 
chemicals .97 While some seek to close loopholes and regu-
late fracking at the federal level,98 states like New York have 
banned the practice entirely, citing significant health and 
safety concerns .99
Rather than use a metaphor like the zero-sum game, 
some prefer shorthand like “winners and losers” to empha-
size that, in the environmental context, choices inevita-
bly have both positive and negative consequences . For 
example, in fragile desert ecosystems, massive solar towers 
that concentrate heat and produce clean energy have also 
resulted in bird deaths and converted habitat for giant tor-
toises .100 So, for the solar tower to be the winner, we have 
presumably got to accept that the tortoise will be the loser . 
In coal country, the story goes, the coal miner is the “loser” 
and the environment is the “winner,” never mind that it 
was largely the low cost of natural gas and renewables,101 
not environmental regulation, that put the miner out of a 
job and created record levels of unemployment and poverty 
in his community .102
94 . Scott Nyquist, Lower Oil Prices but More Renewables: What’s Going 
On?, McKinsey & Company (June 2015), http://www .mckinsey .com/
industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/lower-oil-prices-but-more-renewables- 
whats-going-on .
95 . For a variety of data and information, see U .S . Geological Survey, Induced 
Earthquakes, http://earthquake .usgs .gov/research/induced/ (last visited 
Sept . 12, 2016) .
96 . Bobby Magill, Water Use Rises as Fracking Expands, Sci . Am . (July 1, 2015), 
http://www .scientificamerican .com/article/water-use-rises-as-fracking- 
expands/ .
97 . Gayathri Vaidyanathan, Fracking Can Contaminate Drinking Water, Sci . 
Am . (Apr . 4, 2016), available at http://www .scientificamerican .com/article/
fracking-can-contaminate-drinking-water/ .
98 . A recent decision by the U .S . District Court for Wyoming ruled that 
BLM did not have the authority to regulate fracking . BLM Frack-
ing Decision Is Narrow, but With a Vast Impact, Law360 (July 1, 2016,
11:06 AM), http://www .law360 .com/articles/812000/blm-fracking-decision- 
is-narrow-but-with-a-vast-impact .
99 . Freeman Klopott, N.Y. Officially Bans Fracking With Release of Seven-Year 
Study, Bloomberg (June 29, 2015), http://www .bloomberg .com/news/
articles/2015-06-29/n-y-officially-bans-fracking-with-release-of-seven-year-
study .
100 . Union of Concerned Scientists, Concentrating Solar Power Plants, available 
at http://www .ucsusa .org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/concentrating-
solar-power-plants# .V9gD-zuyuAQ (last visited Sept . 12, 2016); Ken 
Wells, Tortoises Manhandled for Solar Splits Environmentalists, Bloomberg 
(Sept . 19, 2012), http://www .bloomberg .com/news/articles/2012-09-20/
tortoises-manhandled-for-solar-splits-environmentalists .
101 . See U .S . Energy Information Administration, Levelized Cost and 
Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources in the 
Annual Energy Outlook 2016 (Aug . 2016), available at https://www .eia .
gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation .pdf .
102 . Declan Walsh, Alienated and Angry, Coal Miners See Donald Trump as 
Their Only Choice, N .Y . Times (Aug . 19, 2016), http://www .nytimes .
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In a winner-loser or zero-sum formulation, the roles are 
simple and straightforward: for the environment to win, 
the coal miner must lose . But what actually happens when 
the environment “wins” at the expense of the miner? Sorry 
to report: everyone loses .
•	 The coal miner loses first because he has no job . 
But then he loses again because this broad-brush 
approach labels him as someone who is opposed to 
environmental protection . Rather than someone who 
simply wants to be able to provide for his family and 
make a decent living, the coal miner becomes the bad 
guy who hates the environment . And in that way, his 
community loses too; it loses jobs and faces a future 
of environmental antagonism, as coal communities 
now believe that for them to win, the environment 
must lose .
•	 Sadly, the environmentalist does not really win, 
either . By advocating for a policy that is seen as put-
ting coal miners out of work, the environmentalist 
must contend with significant political pressure on 
federal, state, and local governments to overrule or 
amend environmental legislation or tie up regula-
tion through costly court battles .103 Moreover, once 
the environmentalist and the coal miner are seen as 
enemies, both lose the opportunity to work together 
for solutions to simultaneously advance their inter-
ests, as could be the case with economically beneficial 
carbon legislation .104
Importantly, just like a zero-sum characterization, this 
winner-loser scenario breaks down under scrutiny . The coal 
miner is a loser only if his interest is construed narrowly: 
i .e ., to work at a coal mine . If his interests are defined more 
broadly as desiring a job and a way to support his family, 
the coal mine could close and he could still be a winner . 
An analysis by Adele Morris of the Brookings Institution 
shows that a carbon tax could provide ample revenues to 
support job retraining and retirement benefits for displaced 
coal workers, as well as fund mine reclamation, all with 
positive economic outcomes .105 The coal miner is a “loser” 
if we narrowly confine our analysis of the situation to one 
issue (coal mine closure), instead of looking broadly for 
policies that could reduce carbon and build communities 
at the same time .
Winner-and-loser thinking implies that the winner is 
not just passively benefitting from a scenario, but is actively 
com/2016/08/20/world/americas/alienated-and-angry-coal-miners-see-
donald-trump-as-their-only-choice .html .
103 . U .S . Energy Information Administration, Future Power Sector Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions Depend on the Status of the Clean Power Plan (May 18, 
2016), available at http://www .eia .gov/todayinenergy/detail .cfm?id=26292 .
104 . Dana Nuccitelli, In Charts: How a Revenue Neutral Carbon Tax Creates 
Jobs, Grows the Economy, The Guardian (June 13, 2014), https://www .
theguardian .com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2014/
jun/13/how-revenue-neutral-carbon-tax-creates-jobs-grows-economy .
105 . Adele C . Morris, Build a Better Future for Coal Workers and Their 
Communities, The Brookings Institute (Apr . 25, 2016), available at 
https://www .brookings .edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Build-a-Better-
Future-for-Coal-Workers-and-their-Communities-Morris .pdf .
fighting against the loser . By talking about the environ-
mentalists and coal miners as winners and losers, the coal 
miner reasonably believes the environmentalist is working 
against him and benefitting at his expense . In fact, coal use 
is declining in large part because of the economic competi-
tiveness of natural gas and renewables, which in turn was 
fueled by the growth in the “pie” of natural gas supplies 
due to fracking and technological advances in renewable 
energy generation . Zero-sum and winner-and-loser think-
ing obscures the real history here, and impedes environ-
mental progress .
These are not the days for zero-sum thinking . The stun-
ning turn of the 2016 presidential election highlighted the 
dangers of winner-and-loser thinking: this time, it was the 
environmentalists who were the “losers” and the coal min-
ers the “winners .” But this is precisely why it is time to 
rethink our approach to environmental politics . As long 
as we narrowly look at environmental issues without con-
sidering economic justice and the health of communities, 
we will keep creating lose-lose situations . The environment 
does not benefit when a generation of people think it is 
their enemy, and the environmentalists will never win as 
long as they see coal miners as their adversaries .
I believe to continue our progress in addressing cli-
mate change and environmental protection, we have got 
to think bigger—think holistically—to avoid the winner-
loser dichotomy . Environmental actions must be paired 
with social and economic justice programs, ensuring that 
efforts to create a “win” for the environment do not create 
a “loss” for vulnerable populations, economically disad-
vantaged communities, and people of color . We cannot 
think narrowly about closing the coal mine—we have 
got to think broadly about how to restore communities . 
We cannot “fix” the environment and then, as an after-
thought, worry about the impacts of environmental poli-
cies on people .
Energy policy is enormously complex, with technology 
constantly changing the economics of sources and options 
available to meet future energy needs . While there are most 
certainly positive and negative consequences to resource 
options, our ability to mitigate negative consequences may 
change at a bewildering pace,106 even as the industrial and 
technological landscape evolves and changes . Now is the 
time to set aside shallow characterizations and go deeper 
and look more creatively at our long-term objectives and 
policy choices .
Policies impacting energy and the environment must be 
analyzed together for their impacts on communities and 
individuals . Narrowing our gaze creates winners and los-
ers . Effective energy policy requires the optimism to con-
sider how to grow the size of the pie, the humility to know 
that the future is uncertain, and the foresight to challenge 
our assumptions and look for ways to work together to 
reach common goals .
106 . Susan Kraemer, One Weird Trick Prevents Bird Deaths at Solar Towers, 
CleanTechnica (Apr . 16, 2015), https://cleantechnica .com/2015/04/16/
one-weird-trick-prevents-bird-deaths-solar-towers/ .
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X. Questioning the Value of Solar
This section was authored by Shalanda H. Baker, Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Hawai’ i School of Law.
At last, energy—that elusive thing that exists all around 
us, sustains myriad plant and animal life, and illuminates 
our homes—no longer requires massive infrastructure to 
be harnessed and converted into electricity . Technology 
now allows individuals and communities to erect solar 
panels that convert the sun’s rays into electric currents to 
power homes, hospitals, and community centers . This rare 
moment in the transition of the energy sector from a sys-
tem in which electricity is generated by burning fossil-fuels 
in centralized locations managed by public utilities, to a 
system where a range of electricity generation and manage-
ment alternatives exists, has spurred a heightened level of 
regulatory and economic turmoil in jurisdictions around 
the United States . The disequilibrium created by customer-
sited energy generation threatens to destabilize and rein-
vent our energy system . If only we would let it .
Industry observers attribute the swift rise of rooftop 
solar adoption over the past decade to progressive poli-
cies and rapid technological advancements . Tax incentives 
have effectively decreased the cost of owning and installing 
solar panels . Net energy metering policies pay rooftop solar 
owners at the customer’s retail electricity rate for each kilo-
watt-hour of electricity generated by the customer . These 
programs leave some customers with electricity bills total-
ing zero dollars, effectively turning their electricity meters 
backwards when solar panels are fully engaged .
This dramatic increase in customer-sited distributed 
energy generation has challenged the utility sector and 
destabilized the so-called regulatory compact, whereby 
utilities receive a regulated reasonable return on electric-
ity infrastructure investments in exchange for providing 
electricity . The overall dynamic confronting utilities in this 
transitional moment has led to what some have termed the 
“utility death spiral .” In the new, distributed-energy para-
digm, utilities can no longer rely on the prior revenue levels 
from their customer bases to recover costs for infrastruc-
ture improvements or to recoup their regulated reasonable 
return on such investments . Further, in an era of increased 
distributed energy generation, utilities cannot easily predict 
what types of infrastructure investments are needed . Thus, 
they face a “death spiral,” a term that reflects an operating 
environment with rife economic uncertainty .
As a result of these economic challenges, utilities have 
fought for preservation of the status quo . They argue that 
net-energy metering places an unfair burden on customers 
who lack access to solar panels . To support this argument, 
they note that net-energy-metering customers tend to gen-
erate electricity during the day, during low electricity usage 
hours, and draw electricity from the grid during peak elec-
tricity usage times, but because net-energy metering zeroes 
out the electricity bill of such customers, these customers 
never pay their fair share to maintain the grid . Thus, utili-
ties argue, rooftop solar customers create a “cost shift” to 
those who cannot, due to poverty, home ownership status, 
or geography, install solar panels .
These assertions have given rise to a debate . In regula-
tory proceedings exploring the fairness of such net-energy 
metering programs, regulators around the country have 
begun to ask, “What is the value of solar?” Said another 
way, does the compensation amount offered to net-meter-
ing customers overcompensate such customers for their 
contributions to the electricity grid and overvalue distrib-
uted energy contributions? If the answer is yes, as utili-
ties have argued, then compensation should be adjusted 
downward to account for the cost of delivering distributed 
energy to the grid . Under this formulation, the utility’s 
guaranteed return on investment, which it recoups from 
the customer rate base, would be spread more broadly 
among the customer base because solar adopters would 
receive less economic value for the electricity service they 
provide . Further, by lowering the compensation rate for 
rooftop solar, the utility retains more economic value and 
is spared from “shifting” the cost of grid maintenance (and 
the regulated return) on to non-solar customers .
The foregoing framing sets the stage of this unique tran-
sitional moment . By most observations, what has emerged 
is a battle between the traditional and the disruptive . 
Indeed, the increasing number of individuals able to gener-
ate electricity through rooftop solar panels is perceived as a 
threat to utility incumbents, whose current business model 
depends on a stable base of electricity customers to con-
tribute to the cost of maintaining the grid . Any economic 
gains rooftop solar customers receive harm non-solar cus-
tomers in equal measure .
The transition to a cleaner energy system, some utilities 
suggest, should be done through investments in large-scale 
renewable energy projects rather than distributed energy 
generation . For their part, solar companies, the disruptive 
innovators that make rooftop solar panels, see utilities as 
antiquated and resistant to change . Solar companies have 
argued that increased rooftop solar adoption “greens” the 
grid and creates decentralized pockets of electricity genera-
tion that offer grid stability in volatile weather . Traditional 
utilities, they argue, must adapt their business models to 
the increasing amount of distributed energy resources on 
the grid, or become obsolete .
But this framing obfuscates what is at stake: a just energy 
transition . Moreover, it limits opportunities for true trans-
formation of the energy system and the regulatory model 
that supports it . In this zero-sum formulation, the direct 
benefit gained by solar adopters is a precise measure of the 
additional payments that must be paid by other customers 
to maintain the grid, pay for the costs of grid improve-
ments, and ensure the utility’s return on investment . In 
this frame, the question whether the regulatory model is 
itself a useful or just feature of a modern energy system is 
sidelined, never asked, in favor of calculating whether non-
solar customers somehow bear the cost of paying the utili-
ty’s guaranteed return . In its very asking then, the question 
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regarding the true value of solar immediately loses its dis-
ruptive potential . Locked within a flawed frame, the ques-
tion, and answer, will always be marred by the measure 
of what is lost by the utility customer and gained by some 
other party—a customer, a solar company . Most tragically, 
these calculations will almost always be made within a reg-
ulatory model that is itself undisturbed .
At its core, the energy transition invites a reckoning 
and accounting of the existing energy system . The energy 
transition provides an opening to expose the injustice 
embedded in the existing energy system, and the ways 
this system’s ongoing reliance on centralized genera-
tion, centralized ownership, and the regulatory compact 
may actually foster climate change vulnerability, climate 
injustice, and environmental injustice . The transition 
offers a rare moment, within its early-design phases, to 
examine the myriad ways in which the old energy system 
divests individuals and communities of true choice and 
participatory decisionmaking with respect to meeting 
their energy needs .
The transition also allows us to examine alternative eco-
nomic models, such as community power, for the delivery 
of electricity . Such an analysis could help to expose the 
challenges of energy poverty, energy security, and energy 
access in this country; provide an opening to critique the 
socioeconomic aspects of the energy system itself that 
require families to make difficult choices between paying 
the electric bill and buying groceries; and offer viable alter-
natives to the existing energy system .
To uncover these tremendous stakes, rather than ask, 
“What is the value of solar?”, legislators and regulators 
might instead ask, “What is the cost of a failure to transi-
tion to a decentralized, clean system of electricity genera-
tion and distribution, where ownership of energy is spread 
among diverse stakeholders and the cost of energy is dras-
tically reduced?” Further, what is lost, and what remains, 
if the status quo ante persists? What might a new energy 
system, incorporating principles of economic fairness, 
energy democracy, and climate and environmental justice, 
look like?
This new manner of questioning inverts the frame and 
allows for a broader exploration of what is at stake dur-
ing this transition—as viewed from the perspective of 
what is possible, rather than from within the limitations 
of the existing paradigm . It places the incumbent in the 
foreground as a subject of critique and examination, rather 
than frame the disruptor as the subject of critique and 
examination or, misleadingly, as our collective savior .
This questioning further invites the exploration of the 
range of possible regulatory and economic solutions to 
facilitate a just transition to a clean energy future . It allows 
policymakers to trim away the irrelevant elements of the 
current electricity system to expose the vibrant aspects of 
the system that must be preserved during this moment of 
transition . It also allows for deeper innovation consider-
ing the opportunity posed by distributed energy resources 
and alternatives to large-scale energy development . In 
short, shifting the incumbent from background to fore-
ground releases the blinders imposed by the “value of solar” 
frame—itself a zero-sum postulation that pits solar adopt-
ers against non-solar customers—and allows for a compre-
hensive consideration of energy justice .
When regulators ask, “What is the value of solar?” 
embedded at the end of the question, in an invisible par-
enthetical, are the words, “to the existing system .” Such 
framing answers the question before it is asked, because it 
assumes preservation of the system itself, which is to say, 
a centralized electricity grid, a traditional electricity util-
ity, regulated returns on investment, and the same system 
of energy production and distribution . By virtue of this 
discursive framing, the question itself is relegated to the 
margins and value is evaluated within a pre-defined sys-
tem, from which pre-defined units of value are extracted . 
Although some jurisdictions have begun to move beyond 
the purely economic framing of the answer to the value of 
solar question to incorporate environmental considerations, 
I would argue that the question itself must be interrogated .
XI. Less Than Zero: The Zero-Sum Game 
That Hurts Local Communities and 
Ecologies
This section was authored by Jonathan Rosenbloom, Professor 
of Law, Drake University Law School.
Local communities and their ecology suffer hardship 
from a zero-sum game over governance authority .107 This 
game pits communities (and their local governments, 
including special purpose districts) against state govern-
ments in a constant and unwinnable(ish) conflict over the 
authority to regulate or, as often happens, not regulate .108 
Although this zero-sum game is a struggle between states 
and communities over the authority to make policy, the 
manner in which it is skewed against local communities 
has dire consequences on the environment and discour-
ages local communities from protecting and investing in 
their local ecology .109
107 . For purposes of this essay, “governance authority” refers to the legal power 
a specific level of government has to act . This essay is predominantly 
concerned with governance authority at the local and state levels . For a more 
in-depth discussion over how governance authority is divided among levels 
of government, see Blake Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon 
Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and Climate 
Change, 64 Hastings L .J . 1273 (2013) .
108 . See, e.g., City of Commerce City v . State, 40 P .3d 1273, 1285 (Colo . 
2002) (en banc) (invalidating local use of automated photograph system 
recording traffic violations for having an extraterritorial impact); People ex 
rel . Pub . Utils . Comm’n v . Mountain States Tel . & Tel . Co ., 243 P .2d 397, 
402 (Colo . 1952) (en banc) (same concerning telephone rates); City of Des 
Plaines v . Chi . & N .W . Ry . Co ., 357 N .E .2d 433, 435-36 (Ill . 1976) (same 
concerning local noise pollution controls); Harris Bank of Roselle v . Vill . of 
Mettawa, 611 N .E .2d 550, 558-61 (Ill . App . Ct . 1993) (same concerning 
private treatment of wastewater); Holiday Universal, Inc . v . Montgomery 
County, 833 A .2d 518, 524-27 (Md . 2003) (same concerning prohibition 
on unfair practices in service contracts) .
109 . See Keith Hirokawa & Jonathan Rosenbloom, The Cost of Federalism: Ecology, 
Community, and the Pragmatism of Land Use, in The Law and Policy of 
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
4-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 10347
In our federalist form of government, states hold ple-
nary power . Since the mid-19th century, most courts have 
held that local governments are creatures of and subject to 
the whim of state legislatures .110 Two limitations on state 
legislative control over local communities are state consti-
tutions111 and state statutes .112
State and local governments frequently exercise regula-
tory authority over critical environmental issues, such as 
those related to fracking, waste management, and water . 
As a legal matter, local authority to intervene in poten-
tially controversial activities may turn on whether that 
authority has been preempted by the state or even the fed-
eral government . While the preemption analysis varies by 
state, it typically prohibits local governments from regu-
lating: (1) where the state expressly preempts local action; 
(2) where the state heavily regulates the field (but does not 
expressly preempt); and (3) where there is a direct conflict 
between the state and local regulation (again, in lieu of 
express preemption) .113
Preemption analysis is structured in a way that forms 
a zero-sum game . If the state wins and preempts a local 
law, the local community loses the ability to regulate in 
that area and the local action is null and void . In rare cases 
where local communities win,114 states may or may not have 
concurrent authority . While state and local governments 
often simultaneously regulate, zero-sum disputes typically 
arise after an actual conflict surfaces and the case turns to 
preemption—where there can be only one winner .
When it comes to the environment, structuring local 
authority to regulate around a zero-sum game has at least 
two unintended consequences: (1)  it may be perceived as 
absolving some governmental entity (whichever loses the 
preemption struggle) from responsibility over the sustain-
able management of natural resources; and (2) it discour-
ages local communities (typically the losers in preemption 
struggles) from investing in their ecology by disempower-
ing them, even though they often have the greatest poten-
tial exposure to environmental harms .
The regulation of pesticides and fertilizer in the Missis-
sippi watershed provides an example of communities hav-
ing little or no regulatory authority over a natural resource, 
even though that resource is critical to the provision of 
local services and pollution of that resource directly affects 
Environmental Federalism: A Comparative Analysis (Kalyani Robbins 
& Erin Ryan, eds . 2015) .
110 . See Hunter v . City of Pittsburgh, 207 U .S . 161, 174-80 (1907) (holding that 
local governments are creatures of state law and that the U .S . Constitution 
does not protect local governments from state government intrusion) . But 
see Avery v . Midland Cnty ., 390 U .S . 474, 482-86 (1968) (holding that a 
state may not create a general purpose local government that apportions 
voting unequally in violation of the Constitution) .
111 . See, e.g., Robinson Twp . v . Commonwealth, 83 A .3d 901, 43 ELR 20276 
(Pa . 2013) (holding state’s attempt to preempt local government regulation 
of fracking was in violation of state constitution) .
112 . See, e.g., Virginia Code §15 .2-2280 (authorizing local communities to 
regulate land uses) .
113 . Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool 
Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 Harv . Envtl . 
L . Rev . 445, 451 (2012) (citing Talbot Cnty . v . Skipper, 620 A .2d 880, 882-
83 (Md . 1993)) .
114 . See, e.g., Robinson, 83 A .3d at 901 .
them . Most of the regulatory authority over agricultural 
runoff of fertilizers and pesticides is left to the states .115 
Whether local governments are authorized to regulate in 
large part depends on whether the relevant state has pre-
empted local authority .
In most agricultural states in the Mississippi water-
shed, the regulation of pesticide and fertilizer by local 
governments is straightforward—they cannot do it . In 
Iowa, for example, “A local governmental entity shall not 
adopt or continue in effect local legislation relating to the 
use, sale, distribution, storage, transportation, disposal, 
formulation, labeling, registration, or manufacture of a 
pesticide”116; and “A local governmental entity shall not 
adopt or continue in effect local legislation relating to the 
use, sale, distribution, storage, transportation, disposal, 
formulation, labeling, registration, or manufacture of a 
fertilizer or soil conditioner .”117
To be sure, Iowa is not alone . Thirty states expressly 
preempt local governments from interfering with pesticide 
use and 13 more allow local governments to act only upon 
approval from state bodies .118 Only seven allow local gov-
ernments to regulate pesticide use in their local communi-
ties—and none are in the Mississippi watershed .119
Here is an example of the state “winning” the zero-sum 
game through express preemption . The state wins in the 
sense that it, and not the local community, has the author-
ity to regulate (when the state exercises that authority, the 
actual winner may be the farming industry and the losers 
are those dependent on the water as drinking water) .
Even when a state does not expressly preempt local 
action, it can still “win” and displace local control . For 
example, Humboldt County, Iowa, passed an ordinance 
stating: “No person  .  .  . shall  .  .  . apply livestock manure 
on any land in Humboldt County that drains into an 
agricultural drainage well or sinkhole in a manner that 
results in the contamination of groundwater .”120 The Iowa 
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, ruling it was 
preempted because it established a higher standard than 
the state’s standard for the regulation of confined ani-
115 . Nonpoint source is not defined in the federal CWA . National Wildlife 
Federation v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 166, n .28, 13 ELR 20015 (1982) . In 
1987, EPA defined nonpoint source pollution as pollution:
[C]aused by diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources 
and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural and 
urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc .   .   .   . In 
practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not result from 
a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe) 
but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric 
deposition, or percolation .
 U .S . EPA, Office of Water Regulations and Standards Nonpoint Source 
Guidance (Aug . 1987) . The classification of agricultural runoff from federal 
regulation is being challenged in Bd. of Water Works Trustees v. Sac Cty. Bd. of 
Super., No . C 15-4020-MWB (N .D . Iowa) .
116 . Iowa Code Ann . §206 .34 .
117 . Iowa Code Ann . §200 .22 .
118 . Matthew Porter, State Preemption Law: The Battle for Local Control of 
Democracy, Pesticides & You, Vol . 33, No . 3 (Fall 2013), available at 
http://www .beyondpesticides .org/assets/media/documents/lawn/activist/
documents/StatePreemption .pdf .
119 . Id.
120 . Goodell v . Humboldt, 575 N .W .2d 486, 490 (1998) (citing Ordinance 24: 
groundwater protection) .
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mal feeding operations .121 Here was an attempt by a local 
community to internalize or manage the external impacts 
stemming from agricultural runoff in its jurisdiction, and 
that ordinance was struck down because it provided more 
protection .
The examples above illustrate that allocating authority 
in a zero-sum way disconnects communities from their 
ecology, even though communities are primarily respon-
sible for securing and maintaining critical services that 
depend on the local ecology . For example, runoff deterio-
rates the very ecosystem (resulting in toxic algae blooms 
and the dead-zone in the Gulf of Mexico) on which com-
munities rely to provide basic services (such as potable 
water)122 and recreation .123
Prohibiting or discouraging local communities from 
implementing best practices to sustainably manage the 
watershed, including buffer strips, zoning for manure 
stacks, limits on storage and application, and setbacks, 
disincentivizes communities from engaging and protect-
ing their local ecology . This is not to suggest that local 
governments always seek to protect natural resources . 
Rather, it is to suggest that local governments be permit-
ted to take action when they are protecting the health of 
their local ecology .
The examples also raise unexplored questions, including: 
Whether the state vs . local binary analysis oversimplifies 
the complexities embedded in regulating multi-jurisdic-
tional ecosystems? Whether it is a justifiable method for 
regulating the environment? Is state preemption a hidden 
means to permit one local use with large externalities to 
trump another local use that wants to stop those externali-
ties? As it stands, structuring local communities’ authority 
around zero-sum battles results in the environment getting 
the short end of the stick and communities coming out less 
than zero .
XII. Deconstructing Zero-Sum 
Environmental Games: Bears Ears 
National Monument as Reparations 
and Reconciliation
This section was authored by Sarah Krakoff, Raphael J. Moses 
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
Owls versus jobs . Water for farmers versus water for 
salmon . Big dam versus tiny fish . Environmental disputes 
are often described in this way, as contests over limited 
resources that require one side to lose in order for the other 
121 . Id. at 505 .
122 . See, e.g., Business Record, Your Guide to the Water Works Lawsuit, 
available at http://www .businessrecord .com/PrintArticle .aspx?aid=68385&
uid=718a9d24-4d05-4710-b37d-66850cc411e5 (describing Des Moines 
Water Works’ struggles with extracting nutrients out of water) .
123 . See, e.g., Water Quality Monitoring, Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources, http://www .iowadnr .gov/Environmental-Protection/Water-
Quality/Water-Monitoring/Beaches (noting that on August 5, 2016, the 
Iowa Dep’t of Natural Resources marked “swimming not recommended” in 
at least 15 rivers) .
to win . Many environmental conflicts may not be zero-
sum games according to technical game-theoretic defi-
nitions, but characterizing them in this way has traction 
with the media, the public, and the parties themselves . The 
zero-sum description frames our debates, often hardening 
positions and limiting the range of options, both practi-
cally and conceptually . Indeed, “I win, you lose” views of 
the world seem to be corroding every aspect of our public 
and private lives .
Rather than tinker from within this frame, what if we 
pulled back the lens and viewed natural resource conflicts 
in their historical and social contexts? Owls-versus-jobs is 
the snapshot . The long view would describe how federal 
forest service policies subsidized unsustainable logging, 
resulting in undiversified and therefore fragile econo-
mies . It would also include how efforts to undermine 
labor organizing in the Pacific Northwest prevented alli-
ances between environmentalists and loggers . Another 
part of the story would acknowledge that limitations in 
federal environmental laws lead to over-reliance on single 
species strategies .
The longer view is harder to describe in a bumper sticker . 
But excavating the historical forces that lead to particular 
environmental disputes may help us move beyond pat and 
unhelpful dichotomies . In the heat of the conflict, it may 
feel like owls are the opposite of jobs, but reifying that feel-
ing is neither historically accurate nor normatively attrac-
tive . Who wants to live in a world where we have to choose 
between those two?
Let’s consider one of President Obama’s last acts as 
Chief Executive in this context . On December 28, 2016, 
President Obama designated Bears Ears National Monu-
ment pursuant to his authority under the Antiquities Act 
of 1906 .124 Bears Ears includes narrow canyons that wind 
their way to the Colorado River, wild sandstone uplifts and 
towers, and troves of ancient Puebloan ruins .
The Monument was proposed by the Bears Ears Inter-
tribal Coalition, with support from regional and national 
environmental groups . Its 1 .35 million acres lie in the heart 
of Utah’s dramatic redrock country, where the forces of 
water and wind turn cliff walls into natural works of art . 
Canyonlands and Arches National Parks lie to the north 
and the eerie blue waters of Lake Powell to the south . The 
human population is sparse, and reflects the different waves 
of migration to this parched corner of the world—Utes, 
Paiutes, Navajos, Mormons, and hippy/artist/bohemians 
each lay claim to parts of the neighboring small towns .
While outsiders who visit may see little reason to 
oppose greater protections for this extreme landscape, 
feelings in Utah run high . Gov . Gary Herbert infelici-
tously described the proposal as a “political tomahawk,” 
and at a public hearing staged for opponents of the Monu-
ment, said, “It is my belief that a unilateral monument 
124 . Presidential Proclamation: Establishment of the Bears Ears National 
Monument Proclamation, Dec . 28, 2016, available at https://obama
whitehouse .archives .gov/the-press-office/2016/12/28/proclamation- 
establishment-bears-ears-national-monument .
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designation will divide the people . It will create anger and 
division . It will provoke protest and may inhibit our abil-
ity to resolve tough public land management decisions for 
decades to come .”125 After the designation, members of 
Governor Herbert’s political party made good on his pre-
dictions of acrimony . The Utah Legislature described the 
designation as a “blatant federal land grab .”126 Sen . Orrin 
Hatch (R-Utah) called it an “attack on an entire way of 
life .”127 The zero-sum framings by Governor Herbert, 
Senator Hatch, and others include “Preservation Versus 
Democracy,” “Resource Extraction Versus Preservation,” 
“Local (Non-Indian) Control Versus Outsider Influence,” 
and various versions of “Jobs Versus Environment .”
One way to counter the zero-sum characterizations is to 
point out that monument designation does not foreclose 
many different uses of public lands . Indeed, despite mis-
leading reports, the Proclamation recognizes preexisting 
mining and grazing rights . Uses that are precluded (new 
mining, drilling, and other extractive uses) will be balanced 
by new economic opportunities (outdoor recreation busi-
nesses, tourism, and hospitality) for people in the region . 
Further, the Monument’s final boundaries were themselves 
a compromise, excluding 550,000 acres from the original 
proposal in response to local Republicans’ concerns . Most 
of the excluded acreage includes lands that have poten-
tial for mineral or fossil fuel extraction . These responses 
are important, but the anti-Monument crowd will likely 
remain convinced that they lost because preservation won . 
In addition, responding solely within the zero-sum fram-
ing omits the most compelling case for the Monument’s 
designation . So, let’s widen the frame .
Cedar Mesa, the uplifted plane that ascends to the Bears 
Ears buttes and comprises the heart of the Monument, has 
been the intermittent home to indigenous peoples of the 
Southwest since at least 6500 B .C .E . Artifacts, textiles, and 
rock art from each period of human occupation have left 
their mark . Around every canyon bend, or so it seems, is 
another cliff dwelling or petroglyph . The human popula-
tion ebbed and flowed in the region until roughly 1300 
C .E ., when the ancient Puebloans left Cedar Mesa for the 
last time until the modern era .
Fluctuating habitation makes sense in Bears Ears’ stark 
landscape; it is a tough place to be on a continuous basis . 
Endemic animal and plant species provide mute testament . 
Consider the Great Basin spadefoot toad and the red spot-
ted toad . They spend dry periods in states of near-suspended 
animation, burrowing into the sand or under rocks . With 
just enough rain to awaken them, they spring to life, fill-
ing shallow pools with a froth of tiny pink amphibians . 
125 . Brian Maffly, Utah Guv Calls Pro-Bear’s Ears Monument Proposal “a Political 
Tomahawk,” Salt Lake Trib ., July 27, 2016, available at http://www .sltrib .
com/news/4159848-155/utah-guv-calls-pro-bears-ears-monument .
126 . Speaker Greg Hughes Statement About Bears Ears National Monument 
Designation, Dec . 28, 2016, available at http://house .utah .gov/2016/12/28/
media-statement-speaker-greg-hughes-statement-about-bears-ears-national- 
monument-designation/ .
127 . Brian Maffly & Thomas Burr, Obama Declares Bears Ears National Monument 
in Southern Utah, Salt Lake Trib ., Dec . 28, 2016, available at http://www .
sltrib .com/home/4675012-155/mike-lee-staffer-says-bears-ears .
Native plants, like Indian rice grass, narrow, leaf yucca, 
and kachina daisies, have their own survival strategies for 
high desert living . One thing they all have in common: 
they make do with very little water .
The five tribal nations of the inter-tribal coalition—
Hopi, Navajo, Uintah and Ouray Ute, Ute Mountain Ute, 
and Zuni—have endured far more than the climactic con-
ditions . The five tribes, and many others (including Pai-
utes, Goshutes, and Pueblo peoples) at one time populated 
all of southern Utah . American invasion and settlement, 
accompanied by military force, nearly eliminated tribal 
peoples from the southern part of the state by the late 
1800s . Today, only a small strip of the Navajo Reservation 
and a tiny community of Ute Mountain Utes remain in 
Utah’s southeastern quarter .
And yet the tribes’ attachment to Bears Ears remains 
fierce . Bears Ears is a place of origin stories . The renowned 
Navajo leader, Chief Manuelito, who negotiated the Treaty 
of 1868 that enabled his people to return to their home-
land, was born in the shadow of the Bears Ears buttes . 
Tribal members from all over come to Bears Ears to col-
lect piñon nuts, firewood, and native plants for medicine . 
Families hold ceremonies for their children, and visit the 
ancient Puebloan sites that belonged to their relatives . 
Elders and medicine people tend to the land . Designating 
Bears Ears as a national monument, open to all but man-
aged in consultation with the tribes, constitutes a small 
gesture of reparations for tribes’ forced ejection from their 
ancestral lands .
Bears Ears is reparative in another way . The Antiquities 
Act of 1906 is rightly celebrated as a tool that achieved 
breathtaking conservation across our public lands . Many 
of our most beloved national parks started out as monu-
ments . The Grand Canyon, Petrified Forest, Zion, Bryce, 
Arches and more were first protected by the stroke of a 
presidential pen . But for tribes, there is a dark side to this 
history . Lands that were “preserved” from settlement or 
extraction were often tribal lands . The Havasupai people of 
the Grand Canyon lost their plateau lands and their way of 
life to preservation policies . “Protecting” Yosemite Valley 
entailed ridding it of the Miwok and Paiute people who 
lived there . Similar stories, though unique in their grim 
details, can be told about parks and monuments through-
out the West .
The Bears Ears is the very first national monument 
proposed by a coalition of tribes . Many conservation 
groups supported the Bears Ears proposal, but it is, and 
has been, an indigenous movement from the beginning . 
President Obama’s use of the Antiquities Act to restore 
tribal connections to their lands (instead of sever them) 
constituted an audacious act of hope . The proclamation 
designating Bears Ears provides cause, to paraphrase 
Martin Luther King Jr ., to believe that the arc of con-
servation history might bend toward justice . Despite all 
of this, Bears Ears might still seem like a zero-sum game 
to some . But that will not endure . In the long view, an 
action that protects the land and its creatures while add-
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ing justice to the world has no losers . The world is small, 
but it is bigger than that .
XIII. Juliana v. United States and Our 
Zero-Sum Climate System
This section was authored by Melissa Powers, Jeffrey Bain 
Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law 
School.
On November 10, 2016, federal district court Judge Ann 
Aiken issued an astonishing decision in the atmospheric 
trust climate case, Juliana v. United States .128 The decision 
holds that the plaintiffs in the case, who include children 
and young adults ranging from 9 to 21 years old, have a 
fundamental right “to a climate system capable of sustain-
ing human life .”129 The decision further recognizes that the 
federal government has a public trust obligation to protect 
resources from the consequences of climate change, includ-
ing ocean acidification and sea-level rise .130 As a result of 
this decision, the plaintiffs will now be able to go to trial 
to prove, among other things, “that defendants played a 
significant role in creating the current climate crisis, that 
defendants acted with full knowledge of the consequences 
of their actions, and that defendants have failed to cor-
rect or mitigate the harms they helped create in deliberate 
indifference to the injuries caused by climate change .”131
If the plaintiffs succeed at trial—as I believe they 
should—the case should then proceed to the relief stage . 
Plaintiffs have asked the court to order the federal gov-
ernment to protect the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights and 
to ensure protection of the trust assets by developing a 
plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . Although reso-
lution of the case could take years, and will almost cer-
tainly involve appeals to the U .S . Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court, the Juliana decision is 
already a landmark decision . In the context of this series 
of essays, moreover, the Juliana decision illustrates how 
and when zero-sum framing is a useful environmental 
and moral device .
These essays have done an excellent job of illustrating 
the ways in which zero-sum ideas have been used and mis-
used in the arenas of conservation and environmental law . 
As Jessie Owley notes above, the zero-sum concept arises 
out of economic theory but has been altered in legal, and 
especially political, dialogue to stand for the idea that 
environmental regulations often produce an “I win, you 
lose” outcome . Too often, this depiction of winners and 
losers creates an untenable dichotomy pitting jobs or the 
economy against the environment, which often results in 
regulatory compromises that unnecessarily weaken envi-
ronmental protections . As several other authors, including 
128 . Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Civ . No . 6:15-CV-01517-TC, 2016 
WL 6661146 (D . Or . Nov . 10, 2016) .
129 . Id. at *15 .
130 . Id. at **21-22 .
131 . Id. at *17 .
Keith Hirokawa and John Dernbach, note, this repre-
sentation of winners and losers is often false and incom-
plete . Indeed, economic prosperity and job growth usually 
accompany environmental preservation . While there may 
be situations in which a particular resource user’s goals will 
be stymied by a conservation law, many environmental 
laws create win-win, rather than win-lose, dynamics .
However, although environmental laws rarely cre-
ate zero-sum dynamics, some environmental conditions 
truly are zero-sum . As J .B . Ruhl explains, the zero-sum 
economic theory refers to an economic state in which 
all win-win resource allocations have been made, and 
any additional transactions must benefit one person at 
another’s expense . Once an economic system reaches that 
zero-sum stage, it is considered to be “Pareto optimal,” 
or economically efficient . Any further allocations will be 
considered suboptimal, because a person can win only if 
another loses . This does not mean that no further alloca-
tions should occur; it simply means that all the win-win 
transactions have been exhausted .
In the case of climate change and the acceptable levels of 
greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere, we are well 
past the zero-sum threshold . Current atmospheric carbon 
dioxide (CO2) concentrations exceed 400 parts per mil-
lion (ppm), but scientists tell us concentrations must drop 
to at least 350 ppm if we are to have a chance of avoid-
ing uncontrolled catastrophic consequences of climate 
change .132 There is no way to create a win-win scenario 
that would allow additional emissions of greenhouse gases, 
because any new emission releases must be offset by emis-
sions reductions from somewhere else . The science of cli-
mate change is truly zero-sum .
Strategies to address climate change, however, need 
not be—or at least not in a way that pits jobs, economic 
growth, and environmental protection against each other . 
Indeed, a number of the essays have identified strategies 
that can produce win-win outcomes with the right amount 
of planning and proper design . Some of the ones identi-
fied by Jim Salzman and David Takacs attempt to change 
potential zero-sum outcomes into win-win outcomes 
through compensation, regulatory flexibility, or ecosystem 
services models . Shalanda Baker and Inara Scott illustrate 
how strategic policies designed to transition our energy sys-
tem away from fossil fuels can similarly avoid the zero-sum 
dynamic or at least ensure a just energy transition .
To be sure, effective climate change mitigation will 
require us to abandon fossil fuels entirely, and companies 
that insist upon continued exploitation of these resources 
will lose out in the end . However, with the proper amount 
of planning and thought, we can develop climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation strategies that will avoid creating too 
many winner-versus-loser scenarios . Thus, while climate 
change itself has reached a zero-sum state, climate change 
policies can create far more winners than losers .
132 . Reto Knutti et al ., A Scientific Critique of the Two-Degree Climate Change 
Target, 9 Nature Geoscience 13 (2016), available at http://www .nature .
com/ngeo/journal/v9/n1/full/ngeo2595 .html .
Copyright © 2017 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
4-2017 NEWS & ANALYSIS 47 ELR 10351
The Juliana litigation capitalizes on this distinction 
between the science and the policies . The plaintiffs’ claims 
place climate science front and center in the litigation . 
In arguing for their fundamental rights and raising pub-
lic trust claims, the plaintiffs have essentially asked the 
court to find, based on the science, that the atmosphere 
has reached a zero-sum state . A court ruling affirming the 
accepted science of climate change could also help dispel 
the myths underlying climate denialism . This myth-bust-
ing is particularly important now, when the new Admin-
istrator of EPA, Scott Pruitt, has openly rejected the 
scientific reality of climate change . A ruling in favor of the 
Juliana plaintiffs will place climate denialists on the losing 
side, where they belong .
Not only would a victory in Juliana represent a signifi-
cant advancement in climate law, it would alter the false 
narrative that the climate system can absorb continued 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions because future emis-
sions decreases will at some point occur . For decades, the 
federal government has focused on developing policies that 
aim to reduce some greenhouse gas emissions from some 
sources, while authorizing massive increases of greenhouse 
gases from others . Although the Obama Administration 
had few alternatives to this incremental approach when 
Congress refused to be a partner in addressing climate 
change, the Obama Administration also supported proj-
ects that increased fossil fuel production and use . Indeed, 
the Obama Administration touted its support for an “all-
of-the-above” energy policy that was previously embraced 
by George W . Bush .
While “all-of-the-above” reflects a desire to ensure that 
everyone in the energy sector continues to prosper, climate 
science makes it clear that continued fossil fuel use is a lose-
lose proposition for society at large . If the plaintiffs win the 
liability phase of their litigation, they will have secured a 
ruling that accepts that the climate system has reached a 
zero-sum state . Once we as a society recognize this reality, 
we will then be able to focus on developing nonzero-sum 
strategies to move us forward .
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